


Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



From the Commandant



Special Warfare

The British military authority Basil H. Liddell-Hart said that the real challenge is not to put a new idea into the military mind but to put the old one out.

As the U.S. prepares its military forces for the future, it must discard the strategies of the Cold War. It must forecast the environment in which U.S. forces will operate and the missions they will be required to perform. From this forecast will follow the need for changes in doctrine, training and equipment. In order to ensure that all our forces are included in that forecast, we must establish a comprehensive and consistent vision of the future environment.

Recently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued *Joint Vision 2010* to address the expected continuities and changes in the strategic environment by the early years of the next century. From that joint vision statement has flowed the visions of the various service components regarding their role in the joint vision. The U.S. Special Operations Command has also issued a vision statement describing its role in operations by 2020.

In this issue of *Special Warfare*, we have reprinted *ARSOF XXI: The Operational Concept* and *ARSOF Vision 2010*, in order to acquaint readers with these two important documents. The introductory article by Charles Faulkner and Edward Sayre explains the differences between the various vision statements and operational concepts and the importance of each, particularly the ARSOF XXI concept and ARSOF Vision 2010.


ARSOF XXI is our concept of Army special operations in the early 21st century. The concept examines ARSOF missions and the units that will perform them. ARSOF XXI also aligns ARSOF's missions with the conventional-Army missions described in the Army XXI concept. ARSOF Vision 2010 combines the implications of Joint Vision 2010, Army Vision 2010 and SOF Vision 2020 to describe the future roles of ARSOF as a member of the Army team and as a member



of the joint SOF team. It describes the components of the modernization process that will build ARSOF capable of performing the missions we will face beyond 2010.

It is important that SOF soldiers understand the operational concept and the vision. Despite the current emphasis on technology, soldiers are still the most important aspect of SOF. Their adaptability and creativity have always been SOF's hallmark, and in the future, those qualities will be even more important in adapting to new situations and in overcoming unforeseen circumstances.

Preparing for the future is a task that is never complete: the future is always before us, and change never stops. But if we can ensure that our soldiers understand the complexity of the environment they will face and the range of missions they will be required to perform, we will have overcome what Liddell-Hart called the challenge of getting the old idea out, and we will have begun to prepare our forces to operate in the 21st century.


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
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Focusing on the Future: ARSOF XXI and ARSOF Vision 2010

by Charles C. Faulkner III and Edward C. Sayre



The operational concepts and military vision statements issued within the past year present a bewildering array of acronyms and numbers, but each concept or statement is designed to assist soldiers and military planners in understanding the challenges of the future and the ways in which our military forces will attempt to meet them.

With the end of the Cold War, the threat-based analytical process used for determining ways of modernizing military forces became irrelevant. Capability-based analytical systems have become the means of identifying the military capabilities that will be essential for success in the years ahead. After forecasting the capabilities a force will need in order to achieve success or to maintain dominance in future military operations, planners can “backcast” to the present in order to understand the changes in doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier development, collectively called DTLOMS, that will be required.

The U.S. Army’s concept for operations in the early 21st-century, Army XXI, emphasizes quality soldiers and leaders whose potential will be more fully realized through information-age technology and by rigorous and relevant training and leader development. Army XXI will make the transition between today’s Army, the Army of Excellence, and the Army we will need in 2010.

While making the transition, the Army

must continue to be fully prepared for war, conflict and peace operations in the present. The world is still a dangerous place, and the U.S. military faces possible roles not only in combat but also in the more ambiguous realm of noncombat operations. According to the recent Quadrennial Defense Review, American military forces will be in great demand for peacekeeping, humanitarian-assistance, anti-drug and other noncombat operations for the next 8 to 10 years. Regardless of the type of operating environment or conflict, Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, will play a significant role.

The intent of the ARSOF XXI operational concept is to examine the types of missions that will be needed in the not-too-distant future (2006-2011), to align those missions with the units capable of performing them, and to delineate the advantages of new technologies and increased firepower. ARSOF XXI provides an azimuth to guide ARSOF in aligning their current missions with those of the conventional Army and in adapting to the new strategic environment so that they will remain relevant in time, space and circumstance.

The majority of future conflicts will fall into what we term military operations other than war, and they will require military missions such as counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, strikes, raids, noncombatant-evacuation operations, civil sup-

port, humanitarian assistance and peace operations. These are the missions for which ARSOF units are already organized, trained and equipped — the challenge for ARSOF will be to remain flexible, adaptable and tailorable to meet the threats posed to our national interests.

Meeting that challenge will take a long-term, sustained commitment to excellence so that we can continue to develop leaders, soldiers, equipment and organizations capable of performing the diverse and difficult missions of the future. ARSOF XXI shows us the way to prepare SOF for Army XXI while we maintain the capabilities necessary today.

Identifying capabilities for forces who must operate in the world 8 to 10 years from now is not a scientific process — we are not developing an operations plan for a future military operation. Identifying capabilities for future forces is an intellectual exercise that focuses on the types of future situations in which the national command authorities might employ military forces. Vision statements that influence ARSOF are consistent in their descriptions of an increasingly complicated world environment and their predictions of future U.S. national-security strategies that will employ military forces predominantly to conduct operations other than war.

As we seek to understand the capabilities ARSOF will require in 2010, we are also attempting to identify the changes that will be needed in 2010 to transition the force to meet challenges even farther in the future.

Describing the future is a top-down process. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service chiefs and the commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command are responsible not only for providing the war-fighting commanders in chief with trained and equipped military units, but also for providing their visions of the future to their subordinate elements to use in formulating modernization plans.

Joint Vision 2010

At the top of the hierarchy of military vision statements is *Joint Vision 2010*,

issued by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. It addresses expected continuities and changes in the strategic environment, including technology trends and their implications for U.S. armed forces. *JV 2010* recognizes the crucial importance of our current high-quality, highly trained forces and provides the basis for their further enhancement by prescribing the way we will fight in the early 21st century.

JV 2010 embodies the information-age improvements in intelligence and in command and control, and it develops four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection and focused logistics. Each concept incorporates America's core strengths

The intent of the ARSOF XXI operational concept is to examine the types of missions that will be needed in the future (2006-2011), to align those missions with the units capable of performing them, and to delineate the advantages of new technologies and increased firepower.

of high-quality people and information-age technological advances, builds on proven competencies, and focuses on the development of future joint capabilities. The application of these four concepts by robust, high-quality forces will provide the U.S. with the capability to dominate opponents across the full range of military operations. This full-spectrum dominance is the key characteristic we will seek for our armed forces in the 21st century.

Army Vision 2010

Army Vision 2010 is a blueprint of the Army's contributions to the operational concepts identified in *JV 2010*. *Army Vision 2010* is the conceptual template for the way the Army will channel the vitality and innovation of its soldiers and civilians and leverage its technological opportunities in order to achieve new levels of effec-

tiveness as the land-component member of the joint warfighting team.

Army Vision 2010 states that land-component operations in 2010 will be fully integrated with the operations of joint, multinational and nongovernmental partners. It examines the relationship between the Army's patterns of operations and the four concepts established in *JV 2010*. It also explains the enablers and the technologies the Army will pursue in fulfilling its role as the land-component member of the joint warfighting team.

SOF Vision 2020

The U.S. Special Operations Command's *SOF Vision 2020* establishes the framework for building and maintaining the necessary capabilities of future special opera-

act upon warning by employing low-key, politico-military or unconventional application of force in order to defuse a conflict before it occurs or before it can escalate.

ARSOF Vision 2010

ARSOF Vision 2010 is derived from all the preceding vision statements. It describes the dual role of ARSOF as a member of the Army team and as a member of the joint special-operations-forces team. *ARSOF Vision 2010* establishes the precept that modernizing ARSOF requires us to determine the operational capabilities that ARSOF will need. These capabilities will become the common point of reference for doctrine developers, training developers, branch and functional-area proponents, force designers and matériel developers as they seek to modernize ARSOF to meet the challenges of 2010 and beyond.

ARSOF Vision 2010 recognizes that the foundations of today's ARSOF will be the foundations of ARSOF in 2010: quality people, and quality training and education. Future ARSOF leaders and team members will have to be adaptive and able to accomplish missions for which they have had little experience, missions that will not fit perceived ideas of military operations, and missions for which there will be no precedent. Training will continue to be physically and mentally demanding. Individual and unit training will exploit advantages in computer-aided instruction, realistic interactive and distributed simulation, and virtual-reality environments.

ARSOF Vision 2010 also discusses the capabilities that ARSOF will require in order to support *JV 2010* full-spectrum dominance through the synergy of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection and focused logistics.

The capabilities that ARSOF will require are very similar to the ARSOF capabilities of today. What will be different in 2010 will be the equipment and possibly the organizations that will embody those capabilities. In order for the ARSOF soldiers of 2010 to have relevant doctrine, adequate training,

In order for the ARSOF soldiers of 2010 to have relevant doctrine, adequate training, focused leader-development programs, efficient organizations and technologically advanced matériel, we must be the advocates of those requirements today, and we must take time now to investigate what they will need.

tions forces. It carries forward the concepts of *JV 2010* in order to integrate SOF activities and capabilities with those of larger conventional forces of all the services. *SOF Vision 2020* describes the SOF soldier of 2020 as a warrior-diplomat who will influence, advise, train and interact with foreign forces and populations. This soldier will deter potential adversaries by establishing a legitimate presence with host governments. Should conflict become imminent, the U.S. must be ready to transition to a "fight and win" posture. In order to gain the initiative, the U.S. must respond with speed, surprise, shock and agility. Crisis response, SOF's contribution to crisis resolution, will enable America to

focused leader-development programs, efficient organizations and technologically advanced matériel, we must be the advocates of those requirements today, and we must take time now to investigate what they will need.

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command is now engaged in conducting a front-end analysis to determine which DTLOMS alternatives are likely to provide the most value to a modernized ARSOF in 2010. Between now and 2002, we will study those high-payoff alternatives to validate their value and their contributions toward achieving and maintaining the capabilities outlined in *ARSOF Vision 2010*. In 2002, we will begin developing input for the FY 2006-2011 program objective memorandum. We will also begin to transition approved DTLOMS changes into programs that will be included in the planning, programming and budget-execution system.

Forecast, analysis and implementation form a continuous cycle. As we move closer to 2010, requirements and available resources will become clearer, and ARSOF's required capabilities and their implementing programs may have to be modified and updated. At the same time, our focal point for the future will have moved, possibly to 2020 or 2030. Preparing ARSOF for the future is a journey, not a destination. ✂

Charles C. Faulkner III is the Concept Integration Officer in the Directorate of Concept Development, USAJFKSWCS. He retired from the Army as an Infantry officer in 1984 after serving at various division-level command and staff positions, including two tours of duty in Vietnam with the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions and the II Field Forces. From August 1980 to October 1992, he served in the Concept and Studies Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, USAJFKSWCS. During that period he participated in the preparation of the first TRADOC Pamphlet 525-series concept for ARSOF and the ARSOF Mission Area Analysis in 1984. From October 1992 to June 1995, he was chief of the Concepts and Studies Branch, Concepts and Plans Divi-

sion, Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements Integration, USASOC and served as the USASOC representative on the USSOCOM process action team that developed the USSOCOM strategic planning process. From June 1995 to June 1996 he served as chief of the Plans, Assessment and Requirements Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements Integration, USASOC. In that capacity he was responsible for the development of the USASOC mission-area-analysis process, which feeds the USSOCOM strategic-planning process. In his current position since November 1996, Faulkner served as a member of the team that wrote ARSOF Vision 2010.

Edward C. Sayre is a doctrine analyst in the Joint and Army Doctrine Division of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine. A retired Special Forces major, Sayre served more than 16 years in SF assignments, as an NCO and as an officer, with the 1st, 5th and 10th SF groups and as an instructor at the Special Forces Combat Diver School at Key West, Fla.



ARSOF XXI: Operational Concept for the 21st Century

ARSOF XXI is the Army's operational concept for Force XXI special operations (SO). The concept describes how ARSOF will develop and integrate its forces to support the Army Force XXI multidimensional decisive operations and MOOTW. This concept will allow ARSOF to —

- Develop future operational capabilities.
- Lay the foundation for ARSOF combat development.
- Integrate ARSOF into the Army Force XXI initiatives.

ARSOF have proven themselves to be an essential element of the U.S. military arsenal from its auspicious beginnings in World War II to the present. Regardless of the operational environment or level of conflict, ARSOF, consisting of Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Special Operations Aviation, Ranger and special-mission units, represent a highly trained force of audacious, flexible and highly trained soldiers. In the 21st century, ARSOF units will continue to employ their unique competencies to support the regional strategies of the the-

This article is a revised version of ARSOF XXI: Operational Concept for the 21st Century, published as USAJFKSWCS Pub 525-31 by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School in May 1997. We hope to generate thought and discussion by publishing the revised concept. When finally approved, the concept will supersede TRADOC Pam 525-34. — Editor

ater commanders in chief (CINCs) in peace, conflict and war.

ARSOF XXI introduces the concept of complex contingency operations where United States (U.S.) military forces will work as part of a joint and interagency organization to conduct humanitarian assistance (HA), disaster-relief and peace operations. In addition, ARSOF XXI describes SO activities that will occur in complex terrain (urban, suburban, forests, mountains) where the Army's other forces are least capable.


ARSOF XXI describes the goals of ARSOF development over the next five to seven years (POM 2002-2011) to provide the trained and ready forces our nation will need to implement national policy. At the same time, ARSOF XXI prepares for the transition and development of future ARSOF requirements in the Army After Next.

Background

This operational concept has been developed from an analysis of future requirements as defined in Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pam 525-5 as well as in *USSOCOM C4I Strategy into the 21st Century*, *ARSOF Vision 2010* and ongoing Force XXI activities.

Future environment

The Army Force XXI approach to future warfare is based upon the current advances in information technology and




enhanced lethal firepower coupled with the new strategic environment since the end of the Cold War and victory in the Gulf War. This new environment has significant implications for future military operations and the special operations forces (SOF) that will support them. The national military strategy (NMS) portrays regional conflicts, crisis response, power projection and joint, coalition and interagency operations as the mainstay of military operations. Commensurate with these changing threats, the armed services face a challenging future in an era of dynamic change, constrained resources, potential new roles, and rapid advancement in information technologies and digitization that will require innovative thinking and new ways to respond to the dangerous threats to our nation. Future military campaigns will occur in an environment focused on short and decisive conflicts in complex terrain. MOOTW missions will become predominant not only in their numbers but also in their variety. Global information media will report and comment on battlefield events in real time. These future military operations will be characterized by —

- Minimal collateral damage.

- Nonlinear warfare.
- Increased likelihood of military operations in complex terrain.
- Enhanced situational awareness.
- Joint, multinational and interagency efforts.
- Omnipresent news media.
- Negotiated conflict termination that will involve a prolonged transition to peace or preconflict status quo.

Peacetime engagement

ARSOF units actively support the NMS for peacetime engagement. ARSOF organizational structure, highly professional soldiers and unique skills provide flexible options for the regional CINCs to prevent conflicts from escalating to war. Promoting peace before and after conflict requires active and continuous coordination among U.S. military, host nation (HN) military, U.S. Government (USG), international organizations, private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and non-government organizations (NGOs). ARSOF will face increased missions in support of regional peacetime engagement strategies. ARSOF must be prepared to confront a well-trained and equipped nation state, a sophis-



ticated nonstate adversary, or the hostile forces of a failed state in chaos and suffering from disease, poverty and internal ethnic or tribal strife.

ARSOF units are the linchpin to protect and advance U.S. interests abroad with a balanced and flexible force of forward-based and continental United States (CONUS)-based units that can accomplish a variety of tasks.

We need to begin to put a value on country experts, on people who can read the political landscape and translate it into meaningful, military useful information, so that commanders on the ground and in the air can draw the right conclusions about the enemy we are facing.

*GEN John Shalikashvili, CINCEUR
July 1992*

MOOTW

ARSOF XXI will face increasingly complex and politically sensitive situations when conducting MOOTW. These situations, which could occur in hostile, uncer-

tain, or permissive environments, include —

- Defusing near hostilities in peacetime operations.
- Drug interdiction.
- Foreign military assistance.
- Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
- Countering insurgency or terrorism.
- Supporting operations to combat transnational criminality.

The power of current and projected U.S. military forces creates conditions where virtually every adversary will consider or resort to “asymmetrical” strategies or operations when choosing to challenge the United States. A combination of assessing potential military capabilities, studying possible intentions of adversaries and taking actions to thwart applications of new technologies or nontraditional tactics will lessen significantly the vulnerabilities and potential for surprise when engaged with future adversaries. The rate of change in technology and the acceptance of probability of surprise when first encountering an

adversary present a formidable challenge to military forces. ARSOF must retain agility and flexibility and not become “overspecialized” in order to truly address all the potential “unknown” threats of the future. Reaction to unanticipated asymmetrical challenges will be a critical military capability required for the near-term and into the foreseeable future.

Unlike conventional military operations, the focused and immediate use of decisive force directed against an adversary may not always support the desired end state.

In MOOTW, direct threats may not always be present or clearly defined. The threat in these operations may be from non-affiliated rogue elements, non-nation states, or even the adverse effects of the environment or a natural disaster. Rules of engagement (ROE) implemented at the individual soldier level will have a direct impact on the tactical, operational and strategic situation. ARSOF offer our National Command Authorities an acceptable low-visibility or clandestine military presence.

Operations with other nations

Army units participate in multinational complex contingency operations to enforce settlements of internal conflicts and to support new democratic governments. ARSOF must be prepared to participate in peace operations in support of U.S. national objectives. Recent operations in Panama, Southwest Asia (Afghanistan), Middle-East (Kuwait), Peru-Ecuador, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia provide a sample of the missions that ARSOF must accomplish in concert with conventional and multinational forces.

Complex contingency operations may be of short duration or may be the foundation for protracted operations.

Foundation

Current ARSOF units are designed to provide unique capabilities for regional CINCs to operate across the conflict continuum from peace through conflict to war. ARSOF units are an early-entry force


that can provide initial awareness of developing crisis situations and enable the introduction of conventional forces into a conflict. ARSOF XXI requires development of integrated (Joint and Army) doctrine, training and education, leader development and organizational, materiel and soldier solutions in five key SOF assessment areas —

- Strike (direct operations).
- Engagement (indirect operations).
- Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C⁴I).
- Mobility.
- Sustainment.

Critical to this development are the following SOF initiatives:

- Exploit rapidly developing information technologies to enhance situational awareness and achieve information dominance.
- Maintain a force structure with the skill types and grade levels appropriate for the changing technology and emerging requirements of the new strategic environment.
- Refine ARSOF AC and RC forces to maintain readiness through adaptive force package resourcing methods, improved concepts of support operations and innovative ways to man, train and employ RC forces.
- Develop, maintain, educate and promote ARSOF interoperability within the joint, multinational and interagency arenas.
- Create modern simulation-enhanced training systems at the individual, collective, unit, combined arms and institutional levels that provide a realistic portrayal of what ARSOF can and cannot do in a current and future context.
- Continue to recruit, train and retain quality ARSOF volunteers in the midst of overall Army downsizing.

Ultimately, the success of ARSOF XXI is dependent upon people who achieve high standards of excellence. The ARSOF soldier of tomorrow, as today's ARSOF soldier, must be a talented and innovative problem solver.



The ARSOF soldier must adapt to rapidly changing situations and possess strong interpersonal and intercultural skills to complement a firm understanding of military operations in concert with political-military and regional realities.

The SOF truths listed below articulate the long-established instruments of ARSOF success and will remain valid for the future development of ARSOF XXI.

Humans are more important than hardware. At the center of all of our advanced technology is still the well-trained, motivated, intelligent soldier who can make leaps of logic on scraps of information and make the necessary decisions that no machine can attempt. Satellite radio systems, night-vision devices, computers and other tools cannot replace the human element. Tools come and go and are replaced by new technology, but the soldier remains the key to victory.

Quality is better than quantity. History records many examples of small numbers

of motivated and skilled soldiers defeating massive forces. The enhanced skills and talents of a mere handful of individuals in today's relatively small U.S. Army can neutralize many of the large, less-well-trained forces in the world. ARSOF exemplify the tradition of highly skilled, innovative, professional soldiers. ARSOF, both as individuals and as small units, provide operational effectiveness far exceeding their small numbers through their unique talents and capabilities.

SOF cannot be mass-produced. SOF, by their very nature, consist of a small number of hand-picked individuals who receive extensive training and are thus prepared for missions that regular forces cannot be expected to attempt. Whatever the special skill, ARSOF require months and often years of specialized and individualized training. Each person is motivated by and responds to training based on his own inner resources. Such individual effectiveness depends so much on inner motivation

and carefully tailored training that mass production of ARSOF is impossible.

Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur. A corollary to the third truth is that since mass production of ARSOF is impossible, SO soldiers cannot be created as an afterthought when an emergency occurs. An *ad hoc* Army special operations force created after the onset of a crisis cannot be expected to accomplish the mission, despite excellence in certain portions of that force.

The SOF truths produce effective SO organizations that give the strategic and operational leadership the following standards of excellence:

- An expected “high degree of success.” Success is expected the first time when a second chance or a reserve force is not available.
- Physically and mentally tough soldiers with sophisticated, special fighting skills. They are masters of high-tech warfare but are also fully capable of providing low- or no-tech solutions.
- Self-reliant, self-contained and independent operations. ARSOF do not place great resource demands on a supported CINC or conventional commander. ARSOF’s low-signature deployments leave a small footprint. ARSOF can operate independently of or in close coordination with conventional forces.
- A nonconventional approach to operations. Small-unit ARSOF commanders look for unusual solutions that are apt to achieve surprise.

Fundamentals of employment

SO encompass the use of small units in direct or indirect military actions that are focused on strategic or operational objectives. These actions by ARSOF provide the following core capabilities:

- Deny, disrupt, or destroy an adversary’s capability.
- Recover personnel or equipment of national or strategic value.
- Understand and influence a subject’s perceptions.
- Train, advise, or assist allies of the United States.

- Collect and assess information for inter-agency use.

SO require units with combinations of specialized personnel, equipment, training, or tactics that exceed the routine capabilities of conventional military forces. ARSOF organization, equipment, training, personnel selection and tactics have evolved as the threats have changed. Regardless of the threat or operational environment, ARSOF will execute their missions based upon the foundations established in our core competencies and current doctrine, coupled with the seven fundamentals of ARSOF employment for the future. These fundamentals are —


Quality people. Quality soldiers, leaders and civilians provide the maturity, experience and professional mind-set necessary to approach problems with independent thinking.

ARSOF’s high standards, assessment and selection process, and rigorous training produce a highly competent soldier who has unique specialties for today’s battlefield and for the multidimensional battlespace of the future.

Cultural awareness. ARSOF soldiers’ regional orientation, language qualification and professional broad-based experiences combine to produce psychological astuteness and political subtlety. These skills enable the ARSOF soldier to become a diplomat with a rucksack to translate the strategic issues down at the tactical level.

The effectiveness of “soft skills” fundamentally relies on the credibility of the ARSOF soldier as a lethal, effective warfighter.

Multiple force options. ARSOF units routinely task-organize to accomplish assigned missions in support of the theater CINCs. Future military operations will demand complementary agile, audacious, lethal and nonlethal attack capabilities to decisively win under any circumstances and in all environments. ARSOF provide specially trained units that are highly effective in conducting low-signature operations that are politically acceptable during peacetime engagement and in MOOTW.



ARSOF's seven fundamentals of employment are dependent upon people with high standards of achievement embedded throughout the force.

ARSOF are capable of direct and indirect applications of force that offer a variety of flexible deterrent options to meet a wide array of threats on today's battlefield as well as the battlefield of the future.

Joint, multinational and interagency operations. ARSOF readily fit into any type of C4I structure. In addition, ARSOF, because of their intercultural communications skills and "in-theater" experience derived from already being there or being the first to arrive, can serve as the skeleton or network for organizing a joint interagency task force or for integrating foreign military partners into the U.S. military C4I structure.

Highly trained and regionally oriented ARSOF units can quickly task-organize to carry the joint fight to support the CINC's theater campaign plan and peacetime engagement strategy.

Tailorable force packages. Future conflicts will demand ready, immediately deployable and fully trained forces to rapidly deploy with the required resources to meet the mission requirements. Tactical modular packages enable the ARSOF commander to tailor the right

unit with the needed capabilities. As mission dictates, the ARSOF commander can change the size and composition of the force package during the operation to balance skill requirements with organic and nonorganic specialized soldier skills and teams.

The cellular nature of ARSOF, vs. that of an echeloned-maneuver force, permits rapid and precise tailoring unlike that of any other element in the Army.

High-tempo environment. ARSOF units achieve high tempo through —

- Employing full battlespace awareness.
- Integrating intelligence assets from the strategic to tactical levels.
- Employing agile, lethal and nonlethal attack capabilities.
- Gaining information dominance to support operations at a specific time and place.
- Capitalizing on stealth and surprise to penetrate, undetected, into denied areas.

By maintaining a high tempo, ARSOF are able to underscore the permanency of decisive effects on the enemy, withdraw before the enemy can react, then reattack.

Lethal and nonlethal attacks. ARSOF, using modular joint attack forces and advanced targeting techniques supported by timely intelligence, conduct lethal attacks on specific high-payoff targets (HPTs). Special reconnaissance (SR) teams support intelligence collection and provide accurate battle damage assessment (BDA) in support of theater deep operations. ARSOF are able to support nonlethal attacks with fully coordinated PSYOP integrated in the interagency arena.

ARSOF are organized, trained and equipped to provide lethal and nonlethal attack options throughout the conflict continuum in the unilateral, joint and multinational operations.

Future military operations will require versatile, adaptable and highly competent forces to operate in an ambiguous and uncertain strategic environment. ARSOF will provide the theater CINCs with unique capabilities to accomplish diverse and complex missions in support of joint, interagency and often multinational operations of the 21st century.

Operational concept

ARSOF commanders in Force XXI operations will operate as an integral dynamic joint force having lethal and nonlethal weapons systems, complementary nonlethal supporting effects and agile organizations to counter new threats to our national security. To capitalize on these technological advances and highly lethal systems, future ARSOF commanders must —

- Plan and conduct multidimensional, simultaneous operations in concert with conventional joint military forces, other governmental agencies and NGOs.
- Integrate deception, electronic warfare, PSYOP, public affairs and other dimensions of information operations.
- Share an accurate common picture of the battlespace horizontally and vertically, and between supported and supporting echelons.
- Achieve an integrated joint C4I architecture by accessing, leveraging, interoperating with and synchronizing joint and multinational forces throughout the theater of operations.

- Precisely locate and track HPTs with lethal and nonlethal means, and conduct BDA.

ARSOF XXI fully integrates these capabilities with conventional force operations while continually providing the theater CINCs with regionally oriented, language-qualified, highly trained and specialized forces capable of meeting these diverse and demanding requirements. ARSOF XXI will —

- Provide multiple force options to defeat any adversary, on any terrain and in all operational environments.
- Provide the forces necessary to coordinate and orchestrate joint and multinational SO in concert with conventional military operations.
- Deploy tailorable force packages to deal with emerging threat capabilities and technologies.
- Support high-tempo conventional joint military forces, using advanced technologies.
- Support lethal and nonlethal attack through enhanced targeting and fire-control technologies.

In summary, ARSOF XXI is being postured to meet the demands of future operations and to execute the NMS as an integral part of the U.S. Army in Force XXI.

ARSOF are flexible, tailorable and versatile. ARSOF can rapidly deploy, commence operations, and integrate their complementary but unique specialized capabilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The end state is to ensure quick decisive victory in war and success in MOOTW using the most cost-effective means.

Decisive operations

Force XXI decisive operations are conducted during major conflicts and war. Decisive operations are characterized by simultaneous, multidimensional, nonlinear operations over an extended battlespace. In order to achieve decisive effects, integrated joint and frequently multinational forces execute distributed operations through rapid maneuver and fires. Decisive operations are also characterized by significantly increased tempo, precision fires, lethality and the need for force protection throughout all phases of the operation. To accomplish regional missions, ARSOF task-

organize primarily with U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force SOF to form a joint special-operations task force. These joint SOF can rapidly deploy and conduct early-entry missions to achieve battlespace dominance by acquiring intelligence and engaging HPTs to support the joint force commander's (JFC's) strategic and operational objectives.

Patterns of operation

ARSOF XXI serves as the conceptual template for how ARSOF units will conduct and support military operations in the early 21st century. Unlike conventional military forces, ARSOF are engaged before, during and after the termination of conflicts. In the future strategic environment, ARSOF XXI operations will be conducted through the following patterns of operations:

- Provide forward presence.
- Project the force.
- Protect the force.
- Shape the battlespace.
- Gain information dominance.
- Conduct decisive operations.
- Sustain the force.
- Transition to future operations.


For ARSOF units, the patterns of operations are not phased or sequential. They apply throughout the continuum of conflict from peacetime through war to postconflict resolution in all environments. Patterns of operations amplify the JFC's future campaign planning process and provide a template for the road to war.


Forward presence

CONUS-based and forward-deployed ARSOF units are continuously engaged in overseas regions in peacetime to —

- Support regional stability.
- Gain familiarity with overseas operating environments.
- Promote multinational training among the forces of friendly countries.
- Provide initial awareness of developing crisis situations.
- Provide timely initial response capabilities.

Because ARSOF units possess the cultural adaptation, regional orientation, language skills and forward presence that will be required in the future strategic environment, they often will be the force of choice for the theater CINC's peacetime engagement strategy.





An active ARSOF regional footprint is a stability-oriented policy enhancer that can influence and shape the human dimension with words and deeds. This enhancer provides a continuous on-ground assessment capability before conventional Force XXI decisive operations.

Project the force

Force projection involves tailoring force packages to conduct split-based operations from CONUS to anywhere in the world. ARSOF XXI commanders and their supported commanders must fully integrate intelligence and logistics early-on in the planning stages and employ these critical assets to support ground force decisive operations. ARSOF XXI organizations and systems will have to be modular, tailorable and flexible to meet the highly complex and often dynamically changing demands of future joint force projection operations.

ARSOF's ability to deploy rapidly and to counter known or emerging threats in a timely manner is based on the high level of pre-mission preparation, specialized training, and advanced long-range infiltration platforms.


Strategic, operational and tactical agility will

be an essential characteristic in the extended noncontiguous battlespace of the future.

ARSOF commanders will have support and intelligence digitally linked to deployed forces during all phases of the operation. They will be able to develop situational awareness and contribute to information dominance both before and after arriving in theater. ARSOF commanders will be able to transition to a joint and multinational task force command structure to leverage and focus national and theater intelligence and support structures, while the forward-deploying units focus on planning, staging and conducting operations in theater and establishing support bases.

The PSYOP group provides the necessary resources to establish the PSYOP task force (POTF). Recent contingency operations confirm the effectiveness of centralizing the planning of PSYOP under the supported theater CINC to facilitate the integration of national information policy and guidance, as well as policy approval of design, and to develop proposed themes and objectives.

Future technological advances in the global information environment will provide the POTF the capability to design and develop PSYOP products in CONUS and to



distribute them throughout the theater electronically. Once the POTF is established in theater, the PSYOP group provides additional capabilities as required.

The early-entry ARSOF XXI force package may be as small as one person operating in an advanced reconnaissance role or as large as an augmented SF group organized as an Army special-operations task force.

ARSOF will be able to launch and deploy forces from CONUS, establish forward bases, and provide en route updates on board aircraft or ship. Since commanders may be required to “fight” or operate immediately upon arrival, deploying ARSOF units must be able to access national and theater intelligence and targeting systems while en route.

Adaptable flexibility to enhance tailorability, coupled with modular logistics, is the key to ARSOF XXI in force-projection operations.

Protect the force

ARSOF units will be vulnerable throughout all phases of the operation to a

wide range of multidimensional threats with precise and highly lethal capabilities. These threats may consist of a mix of lethal and nonlethal means, including conventional fires and maneuver, terrorist activity and computer virus invasions.

Commanders must be aware of these potential threats if they are to counter them. They must prioritize protection of key assets, critical nodes and essential elements of friendly information and allocate resources commensurate with the threats.

In order to balance protection measures without excessively degrading friendly operations, ARSOF XXI force protection will focus on assessing friendly capabilities and vulnerabilities in relation to the adversary’s assessed capabilities and intentions. Force protection must be thoroughly integrated into all phases of the operation.

ARSOF units must accomplish the full range of force-protection measures. They must protect their own unilateral operations and contribute to the overall force-protection posture of the joint force.

Force protection commences in CONUS,

encompasses all lines of communications (LOC) and extends throughout the regional battlespace for the duration of the operation. ARSOF XXI force-protection measures occur early-on during prehostilities, which constitute the initial “database assessment” for expanding conventional force operations in theater. ARSOF units perform specific missions to support overall force protection through —

- Identification and assessment of hostile capabilities and intent.
- Pre-emptive lethal and nonlethal strikes.
- PSYOP preparation of the battlespace.
- Distributed and dispersed operations.
- Integration of population and resources control.
- Orchestration of command-and-control warfare (C²W) effects to achieve information dominance.

Shape the battlespace


Shaping the battlespace is the process by which the ARSOF commander sets the con-


ditions for friendly success in support of decisive operations. To shape the battlespace, the ARSOF commander must have a virtual, near-real-time (NRT) situational awareness of the battlespace that is shared horizontally and vertically, and shared between supported and supporting echelons. He also must coordinate ARSOF’s employment with the employment of other joint and multinational forces and capabilities.

An overarching information strategy, fully integrated with political, economic and military actions, is critical in achieving information dominance.

To shape the battlespace, ARSOF must be supported by an intelligence structure that can —

- Access national and theater intelligence databases and collection assets.
- Provide precise, timely and tailored targeting data.
- Orchestrate intelligence, electronic warfare and counterintelligence support throughout the battlespace.





ARSOF XXI must have access to efficient and highly mobile precision sensors, processors, decision aids and communications to integrate the intelligence from a variety of organic, national and multinational sources. Finally, ARSOF XXI must have the capability of predicting adversary actions, assessing the effects of terrain and weather, and determining the impact on friendly operations, so that commanders and staffs will be able to thoroughly wargame varying conditions. The goal is to attain unequivocal success by setting the conditions most favorable for mission accomplishment.

Gain information dominance

Information dominance is the degree of information superiority required to achieve an operational advantage in a conflict or to control the situation in MOOTW. Information dominance is achieved through the —

- Conduct of C²W.
- Establishment of a robust and secure

C⁴I information system.

- Production of battle-command information to enhance situational awareness.
- Protection of essential elements of friendly information.

Enhanced battle command will require robust, light and mobile ARSOF C⁴ systems that are fully compatible with national and theater joint C⁴ systems. Digitized ARSOF C⁴ systems will make it possible for parallel planning, intelligence fusion and rapid assimilation of lethal targeting results to enhance the synchronization of the battlespace.

While they must protect their own C⁴I systems, commanders must also destroy or degrade the adversary's C⁴I systems using a combination of lethal fires and sophisticated asymmetrical C²W nonlethal attack systems. Requirements for information dominance will vary with the place, subject and time. Information dominance must be achieved at the right time and place for each operation.

ARSOF XXI will play a critical role in gaining information dominance. Through their ongoing forward-presence operations in theater, ARSOF forces will enhance the collection and dissemination of information on the weather, enemy and terrain.

ARSOF will assess enemy C4I capabilities and vulnerabilities in support of C2W target planning and execution. ARSOF XXI thus will allow conventional commanders to more effectively mass the effects of both lethal and nonlethal means to achieve decisive results.

Gaining information dominance is not a process that can be turned on or off like a water spigot. The process commences early during prehostilities and is inextricably bound to the regional orientation and the forward presence of ARSOF units.


Decisive operations

Decisive operations require the precise location and identification of HPTs. The density of such targets and the level of res-

olution will increase, while the time to react will decrease because of the high tempo. ARSOF must be capable of not only attacking targets and providing precision terminal guidance but also communicating and receiving intelligence while on the move. ARSOF also will provide commanders engaged in decisive operations with C2 attack assets that support targeting and the massing of effects at the critical time and place. ARSOF reconnaissance teams also support conventional decisive operations by providing an exceptionally agile and highly trained force capable of providing ground truth to determine the enemy commander's actual intent when technological assets are limited in application or are unavailable to support targeting efforts. Ultimately, ARSOF provide lethal and nonlethal means to enhance the JFC's ability to decisively defeat any adversary.

Army SF liaison coordination elements (LCEs) are the critical link that enables conventional commanders to coordinate and deconflict multinational-force operations.

Army SF will enhance multinational-



force operations by providing LCEs to foreign military forces that require integration into the U.S. C4I structure. LCEs contribute to synchronization of the battlespace by facilitating parallel planning and intelligence fusion between U.S. and foreign coalition forces. LCEs' on-the-ground assessments will give conventional commanders a true picture of total force capabilities. In addition, LCEs will deconflict the operations of multinational land forces to minimize fratricide.

LCEs provide the required technological links for multinational forces to enter U.S. regional battlespace and to gain access to U.S. national and theater capabilities.

Sustain the force

Sustainment operations cross all patterns of operations and must be designed to help commanders sustain their operational tempo when transitioning from one phase to another. ARSOF logistics must monitor the total asset visibility while maintaining and protecting the flow of sustaining resources in order to achieve an


integrated effort.


ARSOF will employ systems that can be maintained, resupplied and redeployed with speed and agility. Employing these systems will require an innovative approach to ARSOF XXI combat-service support on a regional level.

Regional logistics is a key concept in achieving "just in time" support throughout the battlespace.

In a developed theater, ARSOF will rely on the theater army to provide or arrange for all Army common support. However, ARSOF forward bases may be located in undeveloped theaters or on the partially developed fringe of a more developed theater where there is no significant U.S. theater sustainment base. Regardless of the regional logistics situation, ARSOF will optimize its logistics capabilities through —

- Joint regional planning in theater.
- Tailored force packages employing split-base concepts.
- Forward-projected supplies in theater.
- Early integration into theater support structures, including foreign-nation support when suitable.





- Pre-positioning to reduce lift requirements and to enhance strategic deployability.
- Responsive CONUS-based infrastructure for ARSOF-peculiar materiel and services.

Transitions

ARSOF XXI operations must be prepared for postconflict operations that transition to peace. The transition plan establishes the conditions necessary for the transition from war to peace when the conflict ends. Army SF units make a seamless battle hand-off possible by coordinating the transition with the joint force and the country team. The transition to complex contingency operations allows conventional combat forces the opportunity to redeploy or to significantly reduce their force levels to meet established political time lines. CA and PSYOP efforts to integrate U.S. nation-assistance will be critical in accomplishing end-state objectives.

ARSOF elements carry decisive victory to the ultimate end state. They "seal the victory" in the conduct of postconflict operations.

Postconflict operations provide foreign military assistance (FMA) to the HN in order to build up its military, political and social institutions and to re-establish regional stability. Task-organized ARSOF units, complemented by conventional forces, conduct stability operations under direction of the country team. ARSOF units closely coordinate with NGOs, PVOs and other government organizations (GOs) to meet established national goals.

Postconflict operations enable the U.S. military to return a region to a normal, steady state of affairs most favorable to U.S. interests, and they facilitate the timely redeployment of U.S. conventional forces.

Missions, required capabilities

The ARSOF XXI operational concept is adaptable to a wide range of military threats throughout the conflict continuum. The emphasis on ARSOF missions needs to be increased to ensure understanding, continued connectivity and rele-



vance to deal with new ambiguous threats. ARSOF organizations, equipment, specialized training, quality people and tactics are flexible and enable ARSOF to meet the emerging threats identified for regional conflicts and for general war. To provide the decisive edge for the theater CINCs in the 21st century, ARSOF commanders will need to continually reassess the strategic and operational environments to leverage technology and force structure. ARSOF units constitute the force of choice for MOOTW and are uniquely qualified to support general war and to deal with emerging threats to U.S. national interests.

To promote understanding and to facilitate doctrine development, ARSOF divide their mission activities into two broad categories and eight primary missions. During mission planning and execution, however, these conceptual and doctrinal distinctions may blur in the light of actual mission requirements.

Pure military skill is not enough. A full spectrum of military, paramilitary and civil action must be blended to produce success.

The enemy uses economic and political warfare, propaganda and naked military aggression in an endless combination to oppose a free choice of government and suppress the rights of the individual by terror; by subversion and by force of arms. To win in this struggle, our officers and men must understand and combine the political, economic and civil actions with skilled military efforts in the execution of this mission.

*John F. Kennedy
11 April 1962*

Direct special operations

Direct SO are those missions in which ARSOF directly engage an adversary quickly in a single action to attain a specific strategic or operational objective. Direct SO include counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CPWMD), direct action (DA), SR and counterterrorism. Direct SO thwart aggression through credible deterrence and robust warfighting capabilities.

Counterproliferation of WMD

CPWMD (biological, nuclear and chemical) will be increasingly important in MOOTW and in war. Since the end of the

Cold War, technologies that enable state and nonstate organizations to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — biological, nuclear and chemical weapons — have proliferated. Even if all states agreed to eliminate WMD, the capability to produce such devices with little warning will persist.

Contingency plans will necessarily have to consider the possibility that antagonists could have WMD capabilities. Adversaries unable to match U.S. economic, political or military power may regard the development and acquisition of WMD as an acceptable path to strategic equivalence or regional dominance. In a regional conflict, adversaries may be tempted to use WMD to disrupt communications and to damage unprotected electronics (precluding U.S. information dominance), or to directly attack critical nodes supporting conventional operations, such as ports and airfields.

The proliferation of WMD and their delivery means will require that ARSOF units devote resources to deter and to prevent the use of such weapons. The potential threat imposed through the possession of WMD by rogue elements in MOOTW will limit the conventional-force commander's freedom of action to prosecute the full range of military options for decisive operations. Friendly-force protection procedures will require additional emphasis and will need to be implemented to counter or limit the effects of these weapons.

The following resources will be needed to execute these CPWMD missions under crisis-action procedures:

- State-of-the-art infiltration platforms for mobility.
- Enhanced weapons with lethal and non-lethal capabilities.
- Direct global-communications links.
- Real-time access to fused intelligence.
- High-quality soldiers with specialized training.

Special reconnaissance

ARSOF conduct SR missions to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information about the capa-

bilities, intentions and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data about the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area. SR includes target acquisition, area assessment and poststrike reconnaissance.

ARSOF SR assets will continue to be vital in the future. Information technology — battlespace sensors and national-level systems based on multiple and overlapping sectors — can make a valuable contribution in finding targets. Up close, however, the ARSOF soldier can provide a discerning view, not available through sensors, to determine the actual intent of the enemy forces. Future battlespaces will provide a target-rich environment with an ample number of decoys, coupled with camouflaging techniques, that will inundate sensor capabilities with clutter or allow targets to elude detection altogether.


Infotech systems can be viewed as the second-best target-detection system, to be used only when the primary system, the soldier, is not available or is too vulnerable to be used.

SR in the Gulf War

One of the most strategically important reconnaissance roles performed by SF during the Gulf War began early in September 1990. SR teams of the 5th SF Group were joined with Saudi Special Force and border patrol personnel to watch the long and virtually unguarded border between Saudi Arabia and Iraqi-occupied Kuwait. Patrolling day and night, the multinational SF teams observed Iraqi troop movements, picked up occasional prisoners and kept the vulnerable U.S. and Saudi forces informed of every hint of Iraqi aggression. For many months, they were General Schwarzkopf's only reliable eyes and ears along the vulnerable border. Their actions were especially critical during the early months of the buildup when a relative handful of light U.S. units faced numerous armored and mechanized divisions of the Iraqi army.

Performing a strategic role, Special Forces again proved that their skill and flexible C² arrangements with foreign forces were of high value, this time in a generally conventional war.

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Direct action

Direct action consists of short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by SOF to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, SOF may —

- Employ raid, ambush, or direct-assault tactics.
- Emplace mines and other munitions.
- Conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms.
- Provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions.
- Conduct independent sabotage.
- Recover personnel or materiel.

ARSOF units conduct direct SO missions to attain strategic or operational objectives unilaterally or in support of conventional operations. Direct SO missions are highly dependent upon stealth; surprise; and swift, surgically precise actions to achieve decisive results at a predetermined time and place.

U.S. Army Rangers at Torrijos/ Tocumen Airport and Rio Hato in Operation Just Cause

On Dec. 20, 1989, as part of Operation Just Cause, three battalions of the 75th Ranger Regiment air-dropped onto critical targets in Panama. The 1st Battalion dropped into the darkness at the Torrijos/Tocumen Airport and quickly seized the civilian and military portions of the field. Despite a tense standoff with Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) soldiers in the main terminal where the Panamanians had seized some hostages, the Rangers neutralized the threat within a few hours. They were followed onto the airfield by elements of the 82nd Airborne Division.

At Rio Hato, the home of two of the best-trained infantry units in the PDF — “Macho de Monte,” or Men of the Mountains (an SF-like unit), and a mechanized infantry company — the Rangers’ 2nd and 3rd battalions dropped into withering anti-aircraft fire from 400 feet. Despite the fact that the PDF had apparently been alerted to their attack, the Rangers quickly seized

the airstrip and neutralized the PDF companies within a few hours. Once again, the Rangers had led the way into combat.

USASOC History Office

ARSOF are a capability-based force designed to operate on short notice and under crisis-response conditions. To allow the U.S. to meet wide-ranging threats without committing conventional forces, ARSOF must be able to conduct autonomous strikes and raids. These missions require high-speed, information-collection devices capable of on-board processing in order to support strategic decision-making. ARSOF missions support the national-level decision makers and are conducted under both overt and covert means.


Because of ARSOF's unique capabilities, designated ARSOF units can perform terminal-guidance operations (TGO) and time-sensitive targeting (of highly lucrative, fleeting targets that are either anticipated and planned for or unanticipated and designated by the JFC as high-priority) when highly technical intelligence sources and other collection assets cannot fully service the target area. TGO missions

require enhanced C⁴I systems that can facilitate the exploitation and the dissemination of real-time and NRT information to support the theater's operational and strategic deep operations interdiction plans.

Domination of the air is irrelevant unless air power can be precisely targeted. TGO missions are specifically organized to achieve timely destruction of HPTs, such as mobile theater ballistic missiles. ARSOF operators add another dimension to the JTF's interdiction capabilities. To achieve rapid attack of HPTs, ARSOF must be employed as an integral deep-attack asset that has planned coordination measures, established ROE and on-scene command. Appropriate feedback on the results of these deep interdiction missions permits timely retargeting efforts and tasking of subsequent HPTs. Such feedback ensures effective employment of limited assets and enhances mutual trust between joint and multinational forces.

Counterterrorism

Countering the threat of international terrorism will require diligent and well-trained specialized units. ARSOF units



may be directed to strike terrorists at their bases abroad or to attack assets valued by governments that support terrorism. The integration of intelligence, the interaction of military and diplomatic activities, and cooperation with other governments and counterterrorist organizations will require close interagency coordination. Further discussion of counterterrorism is beyond the scope of this operational concept.

Indirect special operations

ARSOF XXI forces are specifically trained to conduct indirect SO. Indirect SO are operations that ARSOF use over time to achieve broad, strategic, or operational effects by training, advising or assisting military forces, government agencies, friendly nations or nonstate actors pursuing USG interests. Indirect SO include FMA, PSYOP, civil-military operations (CMO) and unconventional warfare (UW).

Indirect SO promote stability through regional cooperation and constructive interaction, producing regional intelligence and influence that transcends traditional borders.

Foreign military assistance

Foreign military assistance is an ARSOF XXI concept that has moved beyond the current understanding of the legislatively mandated special-operations activities of foreign internal defense (FID). FMA is a broad spectrum of military activities normally of long duration, conducted to train, advise or assist the civilian and military agencies of a foreign government to protect itself from internal, external and transnational threats. ARSOF normally provide FMA as part of a U.S. or multinational, joint and interagency effect.

In Force XXI, FMA is an umbrella concept that covers a broad range of activities, always with the primary intent of helping a friendly government protect itself from a myriad of internal, external or transnational threats.

Foreign Military Assistance in El Salvador

Beginning in the early 1980s, SF soldiers assisted the El Salvadoran Armed Forces

(ESAF) as the El Salvadorans fought the growing FMLN (National Liberation Front) insurgency in their country. SF and PSYOP trainers, along with a variety of technical experts from throughout the U.S. armed services, helped train new units in counterinsurgency techniques including civil rights, PSYOP, patrolling demolitions and a host of other subjects. Deployed to El Salvador on six-month tours (later expanded to one and even two years), SF trainers helped the ESAF to create a more professional army.

SF trainers helped create several of the most highly trained immediate-reaction battalions of the ESAF, including the Atlacatl and Ramon Belloso battalions. As the counterinsurgency struggle intensified in the 1980s, U.S. advisers also helped to establish a centralized training facility in El Salvador for basic and advanced training for the ESAF. In addition, SF advisers were attached to each brigade-sized unit in El Salvador to provide on-the-spot advice and assistance. SF and Army trainers assisted in building what had been a poorly manned and poorly led force of 8,000 soldiers in 1980 into a hard-hitting counterinsurgency force of 54,000 by 1987. This force fought the guerrillas to a standstill and established the groundwork for a negotiated end to the conflict by the early 1990s.

USASOC History Office

Generic capabilities required for foreign military assistance include —

- Instructional skills.
- Foreign language proficiency.
- Area orientation.
- Intercultural communications.
- Negotiation skills.
- Tactical skills.
- Advanced medical skills.
- Rudimentary construction and engineering skills.
- Basic PSYOP and CA skills.
- Familiarity with a wide variety of demolitions, weapons, weapons systems and communications equipment.

Specifically, FMA programs maintain a robust overseas presence in several forms:

- Permanently stationed forces.
- Joint and multinational exchange training and exercises.

- Other force visits.
- Military-to-military contacts.

These programs demonstrate the commitment to defend common interests, enhance deterrence, encourage responsibility-sharing for regional interests, and decrease the likelihood that U.S. forces will be necessary if conflict arises.

Foreign military assistance may require that ARSOF participate in the following activities:

- Intelligence activities that support other FMA programs.

- CMO that isolate the insurgency and exploit its vulnerabilities, including the inability to satisfy the essential needs of the indigenous population. CMO deal with the relationships involving the HN government, the indigenous population, other U.S. agencies and the HN military. Under the FMA umbrella concept, ARSOF underwrite regional stability through HA, providing emergency food, shelter, medical care and security to those in need.

- Tactical operations that neutralize or destroy the insurgent threat. The objective is to provide a secure environment in which balanced development can occur. Tactical operations should not be independent military operations aimed solely at destroying insurgent combat forces and their base areas. Tactical operations should be part of an orchestrated effort to gain broader objectives.

- Border security in which ARSOF advise and assist HN forces assigned to prevent or interdict the infiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries. The intent is to isolate insurgent forces from their external support, including their external sanctuaries.

- Counterdrug (CD) interagency activities that disrupt, interdict and destroy illicit drug activities. Under the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385), Department of Defense (DoD) personnel and equipment cannot be used in a domestic law-enforcement capacity. In 1981, Congress enacted an exception that authorized specific DoD assistance in drug-interdiction and drug eradication operations (10 USC 371-380). Designated USG civilian agencies normally lead U.S. CD

activities within an HN. The primary ARSOF role is to support these CD efforts abroad by advising, training and assisting HN military, paramilitary and, when specifically authorized, police operations targeted at the sources of narcotics and at the LOCs for narcotics movement.

- Countermine (CM) activities to reduce or eliminate the threat to noncombatants and friendly military forces posed by mines, booby traps and other explosive devices. CM activities include demining and mine awareness. ARSOF, using their language skills and organic engineering and demolitions capabilities, train HN forces to locate, recognize and safely dispose of mines and other destructive devices, as well as how to manage a CM program. PSYOP and CA teams help local governments develop and conduct public-education programs to increase public awareness of the problem.

- HA programs that employ military personnel to support nonmilitary objectives within a foreign civilian community. These objectives may include —

- Disaster relief.
- Water and sanitation assistance.
- Expedient communications.
- Rudimentary construction.
- Support to and resettlement of displaced civilians (refugees or evacuees).
- Medical, veterinary and dental aid.

Army SF are particularly well suited to assist USG-sponsored HA activities in remote areas, especially in a conflict environment. CA forces can advise and assist nonmilitary agencies of a friendly government in organizing civilian infrastructure. PSYOP forces can encourage popular support of humanitarian efforts.

- Security-assistance (SA) programs that are authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act and other related U.S. statutes. The USG provides defense articles and services, including training, to eligible foreign countries to further U.S. national-security objectives. ARSOF's primary role in SA is to provide mobile training teams and other forms of mobile training assistance. Personnel who provide SA services,

including mobile training assistance, are prohibited by public law from performing combatant duties.

Psychological operations

PSYOP are planned operations in which selected information and indicators are conveyed to foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals in order to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning and, ultimately, their behavior.

The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.

PSYOP employ dedicated, persuasive communications expertise and media dissemination assets to convey USG and combatant-command policies and objectives to specifically identified foreign target audiences across the spectrum of crises. PSYOP support all elements of national power by persuading and influencing foreign target audiences to support USG actions.

In full-dimension operations, PSYOP take on an added significance. Modern conflicts are often protracted political-military struggles between political systems. Failure to achieve PSYOP objectives can adversely affect the outcome of military operations.

In ARSOF XXI, careful consideration must be given to the information environment. In any operation, multiple factions will compete for the attention and support of not only the local populace but, perhaps more importantly, the international community as well. We can expect a lack of credible, unbiased information despite the wide variety of communications media ranging from word-of-mouth to direct broadcast satellite systems. Finally, international news media will provide real-time reporting of activities and incidents.

In the future PSYOP environment, time will be of the essence. Incidents around the world will be reported in real-time, affecting public opinion in the United States. As a result, USG decision-makers may be pressured to respond immediately. The USG may also be required to respond to hostile propaganda quickly in order to

maintain control of its options. Clearly, it will be essential that we provide NRT analysis of the psychological impact of events happening anywhere in the world.

The PSYOP capabilities that will be required to operate in this future environment are substantial. First, there must be PSYOP analytical support for the USG decision making. We must have highly trained personnel who possess PSYOP functional expertise, regional and cultural experience and appropriate linguistic capabilities. Once the analysis is under way, we must be able to develop and produce PSYOP products to support the mission. The development of appropriate activities and the selection of the communications means are essential in ensuring that the selected target audiences receive the right message. The capability of transferring products or messages within a theater of operations and from CONUS requires a wide variety of dissemination means.

Emphasis on the psychological objective and on cultural mores places PSYOP in a unique position. PSYOP can be used unilaterally or in conjunction with economic, social, political and military activities to preclude or to limit the use of military force during peacetime operations. In some cases, the military objective may be relevant only in terms of the psychological effect.

History has shown that a direct relationship exists between the success of SO and such intangibles as the long-term morale and willpower of the forces involved and the effect of military activity on the perceptions of third or neutral parties.

Joint Tactical PSYOP: Army PSYOP in Support of the Marines in Operation Desert Storm

Before the start of the ground war on Feb. 24, 1991, members of the 9th PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group, augmented by the 245th PSYOP Company (RC), were attached to the 1st and 2nd Marine Division's Task Force Shepard. The PSYOP loudspeaker teams recorded several minutes of sound of a marine light amphibious vehicle movement. That night, the loudspeaker teams moved their HMMWV-

mounted loudspeakers up to a protected area near the berm and replayed the sounds. The Iraqis, believing they were firing on a concentration of U.S. Marine vehicles, fired their artillery at the "target." At that point, prealerted counterbattery artillery units located the enemy artillery pieces and opened up with devastating fire. The battery was silenced.

The use of PSYOP in a "decoy" mold continued for the next few weeks. According to reports given later to the PSYOP team leaders, these operations destroyed 25 enemy artillery systems (tube or rocket), two radio-direction-finding stations and a vehicle convoy. By the time the ground war began, the PSYOP team was so integral to the Marine unit that the team was on one of the first vehicles through the breach in the border berm as the attack began — it was playing the Marine Corps hymn at full blast.

USASOC History Office

Civil-military operations

Civil-military operations include any and all interaction between the military force and the civilian dimension. This interaction includes any actions the military force commander undertakes to establish, maintain, influence and improve relations between military forces and civil authorities. It may also include the establishment of liaison and coordination between the military-force commander and his staff and any governmental organizations, NGOs and humanitarian-relief organizations (HROs) operating within the operational area.

The fundamental purpose for all CMO is to enhance the effectiveness of military operations. To successfully accomplish the military mission and to meet national objectives, commanders must understand the two sides of CMO. The first and more important side involves minimizing the effects of the civilian sector on military operations. Commanders use the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available and civilians (METT-TC) formula to aid in their operational planning. The key element in METT-TC for CMO is the "C" for civilians and civilian considerations. Commanders

and their staffs must make sure the civilian dimension is adequately considered in all planning at all levels.

The second side of the CMO coin is the consideration of the effects of military operations on the civilian sector. Once a military force has successfully completed its mission, it becomes responsible for the well-being of the civilians within the area of operations. Commanders and their staffs should make sure they plan for this contingency. Improper planning or failing to consider the civilian dimension during the planning process could lead to a huge demand for military resources to aid the civilian sector. Adequate planning and addressing the impact on the civilian sector during follow-on operations may lessen or preclude this resource drain. Close coordination and liaison with NGOs and HROs operating within the area of operations can reduce the need to use military resources. The Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) is designed to accomplish that coordination.

Civil Affairs forces are specially designed and trained to advise and assist the military-force commander in the execution of CMO. CA activities are activities that can be conducted only by CA forces. These activities include tactical CA assessment and functional specialty tasks as set forth in FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*. CA functional specialists bring certain key civilian skills to the military-force commander to aid in the conduct of CMO. CA forces may also support the conduct of civil-administration operations, which are defined as the performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local government.

Although the requirement to use functional specialists has slightly diminished, no doubt exists that their utility will continue in the future. There are many other possible venues from which the military-force commander can seek this functional-specialty expertise, including USG agencies, NGOs and HROs. However, the military-force commander will still require the use of CA functional specialists to serve as his advocates and honest brokers concerning key components of CMO.

The need for CA support at the operational and tactical levels will continue to grow. Because of increasing population expansion and urbanization, the civilian sector will have a significant impact on all future military operations. CA forces allow the commander to use his other forces to conduct his primary mission, because the CA element serves as the commander's focal point for all integration with the civilian dimension. CA forces do not operate independently; they normally operate attached to the supported unit and are incorporated into the overall operational plan. CA forces work in conjunction with the supported unit CMO staff officer and staff section.

In summary, adequate CA force structure must be included in all phases of military operational planning. This union, along with adequate CMO planning, will ensure that all aspects of METT-TC are addressed to secure mission success and to aid in the transition to future operations. The failure to properly consider and plan CMO may result in overall mission failure.

Unconventional warfare

UW includes a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, conducted predominately by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW includes guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities and unconventional assisted recovery.

UW is the military and paramilitary aspects of an insurgency or of other armed resistance movements. It is a protracted political-military activity. ARSOF units conduct UW to support either revolutionary or insurgency forces that are trying to overthrow an oppressive government, or resistance forces that are trying to expel an invader. UW is a test of national will and of the resistance groups' ability to endure. This level of warfare often negates the advantages of technology.

UW focuses primarily on existing or potential insurgent, secessionist, religious or other resistance movements. ARSOF provide advice, training and assistance to

these movements, affecting the movements' military, economic and psychological vulnerabilities in order to accomplish U.S. strategic or operational objectives.

Dissident elements are key to UW mission potential in any region. As long as there are dissidents, there will be UW potential to support U.S. national interests.

When UW is conducted independently of conventional military operations, it is focused primarily on political and psychological objectives. Countries that export military force cannot do so without first consolidating their power base within their own borders. By creating an internal backfire to cause unrest and political instability, UW reduces the effectiveness of these rogue nations to export their military and political aims. Strategic UW objectives may include —

- Undermining the domestic and international legitimacy of the target authority.
- Neutralizing the target authority's power and shifting that power to the resistance organization.
- Destroying the confidence and the will of the target authority's leadership.
- Isolating the target authority from international diplomatic and materiel support while obtaining such support for the resistance organization.
- Obtaining either the support or the neutrality of the various segments of the society.

From the U.S. perspective, UW may —

- Become the conduit of indirect or proxy warfare against a hostile power to achieve U.S. national interests.
- Complement conventional decisive operations by expanding the battlespace beyond the normal military strategic reach.

When UW is conducted to support conventional decisive operations, its focus shifts to primarily military objectives; however, the political and psychological implications remain. UW —

- Delays and disrupts hostile military operations.
- Interdicts LOCs.
- Denies the hostile power's unrestricted

use of key areas.

- Diverts the hostile power's attention and resources from the main battlespace.
- Interdicts hostile warfighting capabilities.
- Collects human intelligence (HUMINT).
- Recovers personnel and materiel using indigenous or surrogate assets.

Properly integrated and orchestrated, UW can extend the depth of the conventional force's battlespace, complementing conventional-force operations by giving the JFC the windows of opportunity to seize the initiative through economy of force and offensive action.

During war, ARSOF may provide direct support to the resistance movement by infiltrating Army SF into denied or politically sensitive areas. Army SF organize, train, equip and advise or direct indigenous resistance organizations. In peacetime operations, when direct U.S. military involvement is inappropriate or infeasible, Army SF may instead provide indirect support from an external location.

UW: The Philippine Experience in World War II

In February 1942, with U.S. defenses at Bataan slowly crumbling under unrelenting Japanese pressure, two U.S. officers, Russell Volckmann and Donald Blackburn, decided to infiltrate Japanese lines and escape the closing net. Making their way toward northern Luzon, the two men began creating a resistance movement.

Over the two years that followed, the efforts of these two officers produced a fully equipped and trained guerrilla army of about 20,000 men and an intelligence network that reached into the highest offices of the occupation government.

USASOC History Office

ARSOF will provide joint force commanders with versatile forces to support the following patterns of operations:

- Provide forward presence.
- Project the force.
- Protect the force.
- Shape the battlespace.
- Gain information dominance.
- Conduct decisive operations.
- Sustain the force.

- Transition to future operations.

ARSOF will conduct direct SO that engage an adversary quickly in a single action to attain a specific strategic or operational objective. These operations may be conducted in support of joint-force campaigns, strike operations that are part of CPWMD, or counterterrorist activities.

ARSOF will also conduct indirect SO that achieve strategic or operational effects by training, advising, or assisting other military forces or government agencies of friendly nations, surrogate forces, or non-state actors pursuing or supporting U.S. goals and policies. The categories of indirect SO are —

- FMA.
- PSYOP.
- CMO.
- UW.

ARSOF will provide forces relevant to every application of military power that pursues national goals and interests. The coherent flexibility and agility in ARSOF will provide our national military strategy with an essential component of the total Army capability.

Implications

The following is a description of the broad implications of the ARSOF XXI operational concept for the development of doctrine, training, leaders, organization, materiel and soldiers. These statements capture the overarching tenets of ARSOF XXI that will guide each area's development.

Doctrine

Basic ARSOF doctrine remains sound. However, tactics, techniques and procedures will change as new technologies are introduced into ARSOF XXI organizations. As ARSOF transition to the information age, they cannot afford to forget that many SO activities demand timeless low-tech solutions that focus on the human dimension.

Training

Training at every stage — from initial entry through senior service college — must impart a higher understanding of the strategic and operational levels. The three

pillars of the Army training system — institutional training, unit training and self-development — must change, adapt and keep pace with new technologies that are being incorporated into the Army.

Training time in ARSOF units will be at a premium, with continued readiness, advanced and refresher training, and current operations constituting the annual life-cycle of the unit. Therefore, the ARSOF training strategy must include —

- Adoption and employment of advanced technologies and techniques, to include live, constructive and virtual-simulation capabilities. We must train our soldiers, leaders and organizations to work real-world problems in the live environment and in simulated modes, and to hone their skills by training in a variety of “what if” scenarios.
- Accurate portrayal of the complexity of SO. We must train our special operators to leverage and to integrate higher, lower, adjacent, joint, interagency and multinational capabilities in peace and in war.
- Timely incorporation of lessons learned in actual operations.

Multinational and joint-arms training, whether conducted as live, virtual or constructive simulated exercises, must thoroughly integrate a realistic wargame process. Commanders and ARSOF professionals must be challenged to operate in a realistic environment. We should always train as we operate — under realistic and challenging conditions in a joint, interagency and multinational training environment that focuses on complex contingency operations in complex terrain.

Leader development

ARSOF XXI commanders must not only be masters of their craft, they must also understand the —

- Full impact of conventional forces in decisive operations.
- Capabilities of joint warfighting and the ways those capabilities can help them to dominate the battlespace.
- Long-term focus of MOOTW and how they support the NMS.

Leader-development programs, institutional and unit, must emphasize the importance of this understanding of the joint, multinational and geopolitical arenas. Leaders and soldiers will be —

- Physically, mentally and professionally fit.
- Masters of cross-cultural communications and interpersonal skills.
- Computer literate.
- Capable of —
 - Operating under isolated battlefield conditions.
 - Training themselves, their subordinates and their foreign counterparts.

Organizations

ARSOF will require resources to match the threat in each theater of operations in order to meet the peacetime-engagement strategy and the contingency requirements of the warfighting CINCs. ARSOF must be —

- Modular and tailorable.
- Rapidly deployable.

Materiel

ARSOF must incorporate advanced technologies into their future operational capabilities. Acquisition priority will be given to —

- Reliable, flexible and protected C⁴ systems that are fully compatible with the defense-information infrastructure and that are fully integrated vertically from the detachment to the theater and national levels.
- Automated systems that enhance the ability of ARSOF to plan, analyze, rehearse and execute missions at the unit level.
- Protected systems that allow PSYOP products to be delivered over the Internet to target audiences (both specific individuals and groups).
- Enhanced mobility systems to penetrate hostile airspace and return undetected.
- Full integration of ARSOF systems into precision-engagement systems.

Quality soldiers and civilians

ARSOF XXI operations are designed to take advantage of the Army's most valuable resource — its highly skilled and dedicated soldiers and civilians. They are key

to the successful conduct of SO in support of ARSOF XXI. The increased demands placed on the ARSOF soldier by the information age will require even higher standards of assessment and selection.

Summary

ARSOF XXI is the linkage to the Army's Force XXI process of transforming an industrial-age Army into an information-age Army. ARSOF XXI will assure that we recruit, train and retain quality soldiers and that we provide them the right doctrine, organization and training, and the best possible weapons, equipment and sustainment in the early 21st century. The product of ARSOF XXI will be a highly versatile force characterized by enhanced capabilities to counter diverse threats across the conflict continuum in support of the national military strategy and the theater CINCs. ✕

Army Special Operations Forces: Vision 2010

Armey Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Vision 2010 describes the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) template for developing future operational capabilities. The conceptual template derives from Joint Vision 2010, Army Vision 2010, and SOF Vision 2020. ARSOF Vision 2010 describes the ARSOF dual role as a member of the Army team and the joint special-operations-forces team.

This document establishes the precept that modernizing ARSOF requires the determination of future operational capabilities. Modernizing ARSOF will generate the new requirements for doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, matériel, and soldiers (DTLOMS).

ARSOF Vision 2010 describes three interdependent components for building ready and mission-capable ARSOF beyond 2010:

- Building on the instruments of success.
- Identifying future capabilities.
- Implementing change.

Building on instruments of success

The foundation of today's forces will continue to be the foundation of ARSOF forces in 2010: quality people and quality training and education.

Quality people. People remain the key to our future success. The lifelong military

This article is reprinted from Army Special Operations Forces Vision 2010, published by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command in April 1997. — Editor

learning experience must train for certainty but educate for uncertainty. We must maintain our traditional emphasis on selecting and retaining high-quality personnel. We will continue to seek personnel with suitable cognitive characteristics such as above-average intelligence, ability to deal with complex issues and situations, ability to tolerate ambiguity, ability to maintain a clear mental picture of situational awareness, and the ability to make quality decisions based on known data. We will also continue to seek personality traits such as integrity, emotional stability, high tolerance for stress (physical and mental), flexibility, self-discipline, and self-confidence. The future ARSOF leader and team member must be adaptive and able to accomplish missions for which there is little prior experience, which do not fit perceived ideas of military operations, and for which there is no precedent.

Quality training and education.

Training will continue to be physically and mentally demanding. Both individual and unit training will exploit advancements in computer-aided instruction, realistic interactive and distributed simulations, and virtual reality environments to prepare the future force for any mission assigned. The institutional training base will focus on regional studies and language proficiency training. It will integrate training in all SOF disciplines, i.e., Civil-Military Operations, Psychological Operations, and Special Forces.

We will emphasize education that encourages leadership and creative, thoughtful solutions to sensitive and high-risk situations. Future ARSOF missions and activities will require even greater specialized training.

Identifying future capabilities

Identifying future capabilities includes an overview of the global security environment, the unique roles of ARSOF, and ARSOF support of Army and joint operations.

Global security environment. A burgeoning global economy will alter the way in which states interact. The global balance of power will evolve into one determined by economic power rather than the cold war's military power paradigm. The rapid pace of innovation and change in the information and technology domains will create tremendous opportunity and uncertainty within the global economic world. Adversaries arising from and allied along economic interests will increasingly resort to operations other than war (OOTW) as a policy means. While OOTW most likely will predominate, the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remains the most dangerous capability an adversary could possess.

The rapid acceleration of the information revolution and corresponding technologies have produced unforeseen effects. Instantaneous transmission of events and messages around the world have raised domestic consciousness of foreign crises and created momentum for and against U.S. involvement. The capability for rapid interaction between nations involved in a crisis likewise has shortened decision cycles and action time lines. This trend, while not in itself a threat, heightens U.S. national interests in regional events while shortening the time available for a military response to crises.


The rate of change and progress in the information revolution raises the possibility of uncertain change in military organizations and capabilities. Military services lead in exploring the implications of these technologies, but it may be 20 or more years before those implications are fully

understood. Meanwhile, the information technologies at the root of these changes are largely available in the global marketplace, as are a surprising number of sophisticated weapons platforms and munitions. Potential adversaries need not try to match U.S. capabilities but merely come up with creative "niche" or "asymmetric" capabilities that could confound U.S. military strategy. The result is that the United States must maintain sufficient conventional military strength to continue deterrence and, at the same time, develop and expand military capabilities that can prevent and defeat niche and asymmetrical threats.

Demographic trends will equal or surpass the effects of the information revolution with possible effects on global politics. Large-scale population shifts from rural to urban terrain will continue. High population rates in less-developed countries portend a rapidly growing, youthful cohort that may levy demands for improved living standards on states ill-equipped to meet them. This need could instigate internal state breakdown or nurture antagonism between the developed and less-developed states along "have" and "have not" lines. Meanwhile, among developed nations, low birth rates foreshadow aging populations with a different but perhaps equally daunting set of demands on governments to maintain an acceptable standard of living. This trend will also reduce the military-age cohort sufficiently to impede the recruitment of military personnel—especially for the personnel-intensive ground forces.

The significance and effect of these global trends vary by region, even though the situation in one region is almost always linked to events elsewhere. Any or all of these global factors lead to a wide spectrum of military response ranging from large-scale combat operations to disaster relief.

Unique roles of ARSOF. America requires forces who are at home in all parts of the peace, deterrence, conflict, and war continuum. ARSOF can succeed in both conventional and unconventional roles through unique skills not available in the military at large. This success will occur throughout the continuum either directly



Peace, deterrence, conflict, and war continuum.

Peacetime

Acquire and sustain situational awareness by face-to-face contact with local populations and militaries.

Global scouts

Deterrence

Influence, advise, train, and interact with foreign forces and populations.

Coalition enablers

Crisis resolution

Lethal, surgical, and discreet operations; post-conflict specialists.

Small, mature, lethal forces

in relatively compressed moments of time and space or indirectly over expanded or open-ended stretches of time and space.

ARSOF will continue to play a strong persuasive role in peacetime through—

- Civil-military operations.
- Psychological operations.
- Humanitarian assistance.
- Combat search and rescue.
- Security assistance.
- Counterdrug activities.
- Countermine activities.

Peacetime. ARSOF enable the United States during peacetime to maintain an overseas presence with self-reliant warrior-diplomats attuned to local conditions. ARSOF will engage allies and potential allies, rivals, and adversaries with their language skills and cultural expertise to provide credible and favorable first *and continuing* impressions of America's armed forces. Concurrently, ARSOF engaged in other nations during peacetime will acquire and sustain situational awareness in regions where U.S. interests exist or emerge expediently. Close contact in military-to-military settings or contact with the local populace will enhance respect, establish or improve relations, reduce tension, and when required, facilitate coalition operations. Continued emphasis on joint and interagency interoperability will be paramount for ARSOF peacetime engagement activities. ARSOF peacetime engage-

ment in 2010 will provide a low-key presence that is politically acceptable and readily convertible to military applications.

Deterrence. In 2010, the ARSOF warrior-diplomat will be a valuable tool in deterring conflict and war by influencing, advising, training, and interacting with foreign forces and populations. ARSOF's unconventional warfare expertise will serve as a flexible, suitable, and adaptable method in the overall national military strategy for deterrence and conflict termination. This ARSOF capability will contribute an effective, economical, deterrent measure for the United States toward potential adversaries by establishing a legitimate presence for U.S. forces with host governments. Should conflict become imminent, the United States will be ready to transition to "fighting and winning" by building on ARSOF coalition enablers already there. ARSOF will play a major role as the integrator of U.S. conventional and interagency forces into a coalition with a host nation.

Crisis resolution. The ARSOF contribution to crisis resolution and crisis response will enable the United States to act on warning to employ low-key, politico-military, or unconventional forces applications to defuse a conflict before it escalates. Potential crises will run the gamut from human tragedies to armed conflict. ARSOF must be able to deploy immediately and, if necessary, discreetly to flash points in ade-

quate time to organize or support coalition efforts for relief. If deterrent measures weaken and conflict becomes imminent, U.S. success in "crisis resolution 2010" will largely hinge on small, mature, and when necessary, lethal forces to conduct the following:

- Strikes and raids.
 - Terminal-guidance operations.
 - Pre-strike SEAD (suppression of enemy air defenses).
 - Recovery.
 - Combat search and rescue.
 - Counterterrorism.
 - Counterproliferation.
- Special reconnaissance.
 - Advanced force operations.
 - Operational reconnaissance – HUMINT/SIGINT/ELINT/COMINT.
- Unconventional Warfare.
 - Guerrilla warfare.
 - Subversion.
 - Sabotage.
 - Intelligence activities.
 - Evasion and escape.
 - Counterinsurgency.
- CMO.
- PSYOP.

The ARSOF role does not compete with conventional forces but offers the National Command Authorities (NCA) and combatant commanders relevant capabilities that are not resident in the conventional force structure. ARSOF will give the geographic CINC global scouts with established military and inter-agency connections in any potential crisis area. These global scouts provide unique capabilities that can quickly and decisively neutralize selected threats. Future ARSOF crisis response capabilities will give life to innovative, unconventional, high pay-off alternatives where no other viable option exists.

ARSOF in 2010 will play a vital role in postconflict resolution. ARSOF will lead the U.S. Army's supporting effort in accomplishing national objectives to either restore pre-conflict or prewar conditions or implement end state terms and circumstances.

When our nation must resort to war as the instrument of policy, ARSOF will be a full partner in the joint and Army operations required to fight and win.

Support of Army and joint operations. The goal of future Army and joint operations is the establishment of full spectrum dominance. This goal is achieved through the synergy realized from the application of five joint operational concepts: information dominance, dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics. ARSOF will provide unique capabilities and expertise in each of the operational concepts that will enable the Joint Force Commander to dominate the full range of military operations in peace, conflict, and war.

Note: Italicized paragraphs in the margin are extracts from Joint Vision 2010 and Army Vision 2010.

Information dominance. Information operations (IO) conducted to gain information dominance are essential to all the patterns of operations. They consist of both offensive and defensive efforts to create a disparity between what we know about our operational environment and operations within it and what the enemy knows about his operational environment. ARSOF IO are conducted within the context of joint IO and Army IO.

ARSOF will provide capabilities to conduct offensive IO. They will identify, locate, target, and attack enemy command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C⁴I) nodes. ARSOF elements will conduct psychological operations to support strategic, operational, and tactical goals and objectives.

In the aggregate, IO technologies will assist in understanding the operational environment. High-speed processors will fuse information from multiple sources while rapid generation of high-fidelity databases will enable the commander to visualize current and future operations. Bandwidth on demand will facilitate common understanding at all echelons, and new antenna configurations will allow dissemination of "real time" information on the move. At the same time, low probability of intercept or low probability of detection signature management will protect friendly information while directed, and RF energy will disrupt and deny informa-

*We must have **information superiority**: the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.*

Dominant maneuver will be the multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, and space forces to accomplish assigned operational tasks.

***Precision engagement** will consist of a system of systems that enables joint forces to locate the objective or target, provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess the level of success, and retain the flexibility to re-engage with precision when required.*

***Full Dimensional Protection** will be control of the battlespace to ensure our forces can maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver, and engagement while providing multilayered defenses for our forces and facilities at all levels. This concept has global implications for the joint force. To achieve a multilayered, seamless architecture of protection from the full array of enemy weaponry and electronic systems in both strategic and operational environments, all components of the joint force must evolve concepts and technologies that can be easily coordinated and synchronized.*

***Focused logistics** will be the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while en route, and deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations.*

tion to the enemy.

Dominant maneuver. For ARSOF, dominant maneuver consists of two elements: strategic and operational. Strategic maneuver equates to the requirement for ARSOF to be the “First to Deploy” into an area of operation. ARSOF will be equipped with lighter, more durable, multipurpose war fighting systems, thus reducing the amount of time required as well as the size and complexity of the logistics tail needed to sustain the force.

Operational maneuver exploits enemy vulnerabilities to infiltrate and exfiltrate hostile and denied areas. This maneuver allows ARSOF to conduct operations at unexpected times and places and to strike enemy vulnerabilities in unanticipated ways. ARSOF will exploit situational understanding technology to synchronize ARSOF with land force operational maneuver.

ARSOF support dominant maneuver through special reconnaissance targeted on operational objectives for conventional land forces to maneuver against. They also support dominant maneuver through direct action missions that attack critical enemy operational C4I nodes. These actions decrease the enemy’s ability to react to friendly maneuver. During coalition operations, ARSOF provide language-qualified and culturally attuned soldiers who provide the land component commander interface and connectivity with allied forces.

ARSOF can facilitate dominant maneuver by supporting deception plans, by decreasing enemy morale and effectiveness, and by using strategic, tactical, and operational psychological operations to induce the enemy to surrender without fighting. ARSOF support dominant maneuver by integrating consideration of movement and caring for the civil population resident in the battle area. After the battle, ARSOF help the conventional commander with consolidating gains, enabling early withdrawal of friendly forces, and laying the foundation for the resumption of lawful affairs.

Precision engagement. ARSOF support precision engagement operations by the joint force command through special reconnaissance with ARSOF elements acting as

sensors reporting locations of high priority targets to the targeting system. They can also attack targets directly or by using target marking systems that allow other weapons systems to accurately engage the target. The same elements provide the battle damage assessment to facilitate reengagement if required. ARSOF elements will use information programs to target specific audiences with the intent to influence them to support U.S. and allied goals and objectives.

The land component commander (LCC) sets the conditions for success by shaping the battlespace. Shaping the battlespace begins with early intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). Early deployed ARSOF provide the LCC with a sensor through which he acquires real-time information about enemy forces. IPB supports identification of the enemy’s main effort and enables the LCC to *decide* which high-value targets to engage to facilitate his scheme of maneuver; prioritize and sequence collection assets to *detect* and track those targets; and select appropriate weapon systems to *deliver* the correct munitions to destroy those targets where and when he chooses.

Information technologies will facilitate sharing “real-time” information among all services, allies, and coalition partners. Technologies to be exploited will permit isolating, tagging, and tracking moving enemy forces and targets with precision. Immediate and accurate battle damage assessment provided by ARSOF will facilitate reengagement. As future joint forces combine processes to make virtually any enemy force or target accessible, other technologies will enhance the intelligence and precision of the weapons used to engage them.

Full-dimensional protection. For ARSOF, full-dimensional protection consists of maintaining low unit signatures through modularity and task organization. Operating at night or during periods of limited visibility will remain key means for protecting forces committed on operational missions.

ARSOF support the LCC’s full-dimensional protection program by locating, targeting, and/or attacking threat theater

missile defense systems. ARSOF will identify and neutralize terrorist agencies that threaten the safety of U.S. and allied forces. ARSOF will also provide information and training to joint forces to immunize them against potential threat propaganda themes and symbols. ARSOF will provide a means for the reestablishment of civilian control over territory seized or occupied by the LCC.


Advanced technologies will provide vastly improved personal armor, chemical and biological protection ensembles, reduced signature enhancements, and improved night vision devices. Concepts and technologies that support dominant maneuver will also contribute to protecting the force.

Focused logistics. For ARSOF, focused logistics will entail small, tailored, austere logistics packages capable of providing limited support to ARSOF units deployed to

the area of operations before the Army logistics system is established or when no Army logistics system is planned.

Technology will greatly enable the concept of focused logistics. Smaller fighting elements with easily maintainable equipment, made of more durable materials that share repair-part commonality among component-specific equipment and equipment in other components, will significantly reduce the volume and complexity of the resupply system. Precision weapons with increased lethality and durability and fuel-efficient systems will generate reductions in demands on the sustainment infrastructure. Semiautomatic, built-in, diagnostic sensors will anticipate failure and initiate resupply or replacement activities before failures occur. A vast array of advances in human support and medical care technologies, including "internet triage" and

BY 2002, PREPARE A CONCEPT FOR THE ARSOF 2010 "TEAM OF TEAMS"



Current and future capabilities.

Focused logistics, clearly, is the most applicable operational concept across the patterns of operation. No other concept is executable without focused logistics.

ARSOF Vision 2010 will channel innovative experimentation, training, and technology to produce the most effective force for 2010. Changing ARSOF doctrine, training, leader development policy, organizations, and matériel for the challenges of 2010 will follow a disciplined process.

Between now and 2002, we will continue to follow the USSOCOM Strategic Planning Process for developing program objective memorandum (POM) input. That process improves force readiness by improving its capacity to perform current capabilities. However, by 2002, we need to know what DTLOMS changes will be necessary for ARSOF to attain an optimum capability by 2010.


With 2010 as our goal, we have four years to identify which elements of DTLOMS need changing and what

resources are needed to implement those changes. In 2002, we will prepare the POM for the years 2006-2011. This POM will specify the necessary dollars and manpower to modernize the force by 2010.


The choice of the year 2010 as the target date for implementing changes is not arbitrary. By the year 2010, the Army will buy out legacy systems and other systems will wear out. Between 2000 and 2010, new systems will begin migrating into the force, e.g., Force XXI digitization programs, avionics for SOA, the Joint Base System.

The process ARSOF will follow to determine mission needs and operational requirements for 2010 must be simultaneously disciplined to reach our goal and flexible enough to respond to uncertainty. ARSOF Vision 2010 takes the first step in the process. ARSOF 2010 describes the global security environment and implications for ARSOF in 2010. Within these parameters and the anticipated future resource constraints, we must determine the best way to employ ARSOF built on good people who are well trained and well educated.

Next, we must develop and validate by 2002 an operational concept for ARSOF



How to develop future operational capabilities.



The concept development cycle.

(CA, PSYOP, SF, Rangers, SO Aviation, and SO support functions) that describes—

- Principles, missions, and employment of ARSOF.
- Integration with the joint and Army operational concepts for 2010.
 - Information dominance.
 - Dominant maneuver.
 - Precision engagement.
 - Full-dimensional protection.
 - Focused logistics.
- Contribution to crisis response and crisis resolution.
- Support of national defense against WMD.

Inherent to the operational concept will be the development of the ARSOF future operational capabilities list that describes the tasks required to implement the operational concept. From this list, a priority of effort will be determined to focus the ARSOF studies, tests, and experiments to validate force design, matériel (R&D), and capabilities to support leader and training development.

Between now and 2002 we will execute our process in a yearly cyclical manner. We will review the operational concepts and update them as directed by the commanding general. We also will review operational capabilities, status of models and

scenarios, and results of ongoing studies and experiments in accordance with the concept development cycle. Every two years, the operational concepts will be validated as a part of the USSOCOM and Army POM development processes.

Any new capabilities that emerge before 2010 will be integrated into ARSOF as resources become available.

ARSOF Vision 2010 is the first step in maintaining our forward-thinking leadership as part of the joint and Army team. We cannot afford to wait for the future to become more clear or to creep forward maintaining our current capabilities with incremental product improvements. The future portends dynamic change in how military power relates to national policy and the way in which military forces will be employed. Learning to manage the potential of advanced technologies will be critical to our journey into the future. We must start now to develop new ways of doing business, phasing out the old ideas and molding a 21st-century ARSOF “Team of Teams” built around the best soldiers our nation has ever known. ✕

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Letters

Special Warfare

Automation training essential for SF

The Special Forces community is sailing into some fairly uncharted waters — the sea of automation. Nowadays we find briefbacks, OPLANs, training schedules, and team, company and battalion databases in electronic format. More and more people are talking about this or that feature of a particular system. Hardly anybody talks about training.

My concern is this: We are requiring our people to perform on a weapon system — and automation is potentially that — with no training. We require products during NCOES and during actual operations to be automated, and yet we have no formal course of automation instruction in our SF training system.

It is essential that every member of the SF team be proficient in automation. During recent operations, and routinely during SF O&I, the Worldwide Web is used as a source of data for area studies. The NCOES will soon be using distance learning via the Internet; all the groups will eventually be on a LAN system; and we are beginning to develop a demining BBS system in Africa. In the not-too-distant future, the 18B may be cellular-linked to the fire-support element; the 18C may be using a personal digital assistant to coordinate demining operations; the OCONUS 18D may be receiving surgical advice from Fort Bragg; and the 18E may be making a commo shot daily via a secure 800-number hookup through the Internet.

The SF community has always

been at the forefront of new technology, and information-management should be no exception. Here are some suggestions:

- Train a couple of people from each ODB on the standard software in use in each company. Make them the master trainers for the ODAs.

- As time permits, train at least two people from each ODA on the standard software.

- Treat the automation training as you would weapons training.

- Develop an informal relationship with the folks who developed the application you use. Tech support will save your bacon when everything crashes — and everything will.

- Train your people, especially at battalion level, before you implement new software or systems. Fatal errors will occur if you don't.

- Put some meat on the bones of the ADP additional-duty position. This person has to be the subject-matter expert.

*SFC Timothy A. Beckman
96th CA Battalion
Fort Bragg, N.C.*

Process robs units of complete history

Over the past few years there has been a disturbing trend in the special-operations community: the use of derivative unit identification codes, or DUICs. Under the provisions of AR 600-8-22, Chapter 7, units may receive awards, campaign streamers and other campaign credits as determined by the Army Department of Military History. The intent is to recognize those units (or their subsets) that

served in designated operations by giving them awards and streamers. The DMH keeps track of credits and honors by unit identification code and unit name.

Herein lies the problem: The special-operations community uses DUICs to label each "unit" that deploys on a contingency operation. It may label a deploying group of soldiers "422 CA Support Element 4" even if some of the soldiers are not or never have been members of any part of the 422nd. The DUIC will cease to exist when that unit redeploys. How will the DMH issue campaign credits and unit awards to this temporary grouping of soldiers? Which soldiers joining the unit *in the future* will be allowed to wear the unit awards?

Using DUICs deprives units of campaign credit and robs the future of our history. In 50 years, when historians review military records, they will have no way of knowing about all the operations a unit participated in. There will be a gap in some of SOF's greatest success stories: Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia (none of which have yet been designated as "campaigns").

In time, there will be no soldiers left in the unit who are authorized permanent wear of the unit awards presented to their DUIC unit. And with that, a piece of our history will die.

*MAJ Christopher H. Tilley
422nd CA Battalion
Greensboro, N.C.*



Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

SF seeking drill-sergeant, recruiter volunteers

The Special Forces Enlisted Branch is seeking volunteers for both drill-sergeant and recruiter duty. Applicants must have an MOS of 18B, 18C or 18F and be in the grade of E6 or E7. Drill sergeants will serve a two-year tour of duty in basic-training units at Fort Sill, Okla.; Fort Jackson, S.C.; or Fort Knox, Ky. Recruiters will serve a three-year tour; their assignment locations will be determined by the Army Recruiting Command's current and projected requirements. For more information phone SFC Timothy Prescott at DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395.

Enlisted career adviser answers FAQs

The SF Enlisted Branch senior career adviser provides the following responses to the three most frequently asked career/assignment questions:

Q. *Why can't I be reclassified from my current PMOS to PMOS 18F?*

A. Although 99 percent of CMF 18 soldiers who request reclassification to 18F are fully qualified, the current mix and balance of CMF 18 MOS strengths prevent the branch from reclassifying these soldiers. When the feeder MOSs (18B/C/D/E) are below authorized strengths, the branch does not reclassify a soldier from one understrength MOS to another understrength MOS. However, the soldier's commander may direct that the soldier be assigned to an 18F position within the unit if such a requirement exists. This allows the soldier to be rated in his duty MOS (18F) while he retains his PMOS; it helps the branch maintain a balance in unit and overall CMF MOS strengths; it enables the soldiers to achieve career development; and it fulfills the commander's requirement to have the right man in the right job.

Q. *Why can't I remain beyond the standard tour length in assignments outside the Special Forces groups?*

A. Of the 4,505 E6-E9 authorizations currently allocated to CMF 18, only 1,210 are outside the SF groups. For this reason, it is crucial that soldiers comply with their new assignment instructions once their tours are complete. Other deserving soldiers are waiting for an opportunity to rotate into such assignments.

Q. *Why can't I swap assignments with another soldier?*

A. At the company level, it makes perfect sense to say "I'm an 18C, and he's an 18C. I don't want the assignment, and he does." However, the assignment process at HQDA level is not so simple. In order to meet the demands of worldwide priority-fill authorizations while working with a limited budget and a limited distributable operating inventory, the SF Enlisted Branch must manage the force with precision. There is a cost associated with every soldier's move. Soldiers who have the least amount of time on-station or who have served in OCONUS assignments cost more to move than those who have had a long period of time at one station or who have never served in OCONUS assignments. But the overarching reason for

selecting a specific soldier for an assignment is that he is the most qualified or most eligible man at that time to fill an existing requirement. Simply put, time and resources do not exist to try to match every assignment to the personal desires of soldiers.

PERSCOM points of contact

Staff members of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, are as follows:

LTC Michael W. Grant	SF Enlisted Branch chief
MSG Randy Earp	Senior career adviser
SFC Timothy Prescott	CMF 37F career adviser; USACAPOC; 4th POG; 96th CA; NCOES and schools manager; drill sergeants; recruiters
Mrs. Faye Matheny	Career branch integrator
Mrs. Rhonda Ruano	1st, 5th and 10th SF groups; JRTC; USSOCOM; SFOD-K; SOCPAC; SOCEUR; SOCCENT
Ms. Pam Wilson	3rd and 7th SF groups; JFKSWCS; USASOC; USASFC; ROTC; JOTB; SOCSOUTH
Ms. Dyna Amey	SFAS; SFQC

Assignment-related questions should be directed to the assignment manager. Career-development questions should be directed to either the PDNCO or the senior career adviser. SFQC students who have questions about assignments should get in touch with their student PAC, company first sergeant or sergeant major. NCOES questions should be directed to the unit's schools NCO. For telephone inquiries, call DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395. Address correspondence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0452. The e-mail address is epsf@hoffman-emh1.army.mil. The SF Enlisted Branch homepage can be accessed through PERSCOM Online (<http://www-perscom.army.mil>).



Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Board selects 73 SF officers for promotion to major

The FY 97 Army promotion-selection board for majors considered 208 SF officers and selected 73 for promotion. The statistics were as follows:

Above the zone			
	Considered	Selected	%
SF	4	0	0.0
Army	117	11	9.4
Promotion zone			
	Considered	Selected	%
SF	91	69	75.8
Army	2222	1650	74.2
Below the zone			
	Considered	Selected	%
SF	113	4	3.5
Army	2218	134	6.0

The FY 97 board results for SF were below those of FY 96; however, the figures were positive for the branch: The overall select rates (total selected divided by the PZ number considered) were 80.2 percent for SF vs. 80.7 percent for the Army. The branch’s overall select rate is an indicator that SF officers continue to be competitive for promotion to major. The low number of SF majors selected (73) is the result of an understrength year group (1987). The branch needs to maintain approximately 550 majors to sustain a target colonel population of 150. Pending validation under OPMS XXI, these figures will remain the JFKSWCS goals for the SF branch. The current inventory is 382 majors and captains-promotable. (Promotable majors are not included in these figures). The number of SF majors will increase as larger year groups of SF captains enter the promotion zone. The end of the drawdown, combined with increased promotion numbers, will hasten the growth of the SF major population.

96 FA 39 officers selected for promotion to major

The FY 97 Army promotion-selection board for majors considered 273 FA 39 captains (5-AZ, 119-PZ, 149-BZ) for promotion and selected 96 (2-AZ, 89-PZ, 5-BZ). Thirty-four of the officers selected are graduates of the fully funded FA 39 master’s-degree program. Of 33 fully trained PSYOP officers considered, 28 were selected. Of 31 fully trained CA officers considered, 25 were selected. The remainder of the officers selected are beginning their FA 39 training or have not become available for training.

WO leader development rests on three pillars

- According to DA PAM 600-11, *WO Professional Development*, there are three pillars of leader development for SF warrant officers:
- Institutional training and education.
 - Schools such as the Army Ranger School and the Defense Language

- Institute; and courses such as Advanced Special Operations Techniques Course, or ASOT; ASOT Managers' Course; Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance Target Analysis and Exploitation Course; PSYOP Officer Course; and Civil Affairs Officer Course.
- The Degree Completion Program, or DCP, allows for associate's- and bachelor's-degree training for top-performing warrant officers.
 - Operational assignments.
 - Assistant detachment commander or detachment commander, as required (5-7 years), WO1-CW3.
 - Company operations warrant officer, CW3.
 - Battalion operations warrant officer, CW4.
 - Group intelligence warrant officer, CW5.
 - Group operations warrant officer, CW5.
 - Self-development.
 - The MOS 180A career goal for foreign-language proficiency is L2/R2/S1+.
 - Numerous language programs are available for self-study.
 - Progress toward a language goal can be documented on the Officer Record Brief. That progress is seen as an indicator of self-development and initiative.
 - College degrees obtained through evening study (not under the DCP) are indicated on the ORB by an "E" following the degree type. Seeking advanced education is another indicator of initiative.

For more information on SF warrant officer professional development, phone the SOPO MOS 180A Manager, CW4 Shaun Driscoll, at DSN 239-2415/9002 or commercial (910) 432-2415/9002.

**FA 39 LTC selection rate
much improved**

The FY 97 lieutenant-colonel promotion-selection board considered 29 FA 39 officers and selected 17 — a selection rate of 58.6 percent. The Department of Army's selection rate was 59.9 percent. The FA 39 selection rate reflects a tremendous improvement over the last several lieutenant-colonel promotion boards.

**Four FA 39 officers selected
for senior service colleges**

The 1997 senior-service-college selection board selected four FA 39 officers. Those selected had served an average of 93.25 months as an FA 39 officer. All are former battalion commanders; three served in joint assignments; and three served as battalion executive officers. Three are fully trained officers (PSYOP Officer Course or Civil Affairs Course, Regional Studies Course and language training) and three have master's degrees.



Foreign SOF

Special Warfare

'White Legion' aggravates Caucasus instability

Russian border troops patrolling the Georgian-Turkish border, as well as Russian peacekeeping forces deployed to Abkhazia, continue to be the targets of armed attacks. Widely suspected in these incidents is the so-called "White Legion," a collection of armed dissident groups based largely in western Georgia. The White Legion was established in 1996 to carry out sabotage in separatist Abkhazia and to attack Russian forces there and in Georgia proper. White Legion detachments are thought to operate in 25-man groups. To facilitate their movements near Russian peacekeeping forces, the White Legion recruits ethnic Slavs who have had experience in airborne and "special" units. Estimates of the White Legion's strength vary widely, and its membership is reported to include Turks and Jordanians as well as Chechens and other mercenaries. White Legion spokesmen have threatened to "organize a major bloodbath in the Caucasus, bigger than the Chechen one," unless the Russian forces withdraw. A separate Abkhazia was established after a year-long Georgian civil war that ended in the fall of 1993, but its sovereignty continues to be challenged by Georgia. Since the civil war ended, large-scale conflict has threatened to erupt again, possibly leading to broader conflict in the Caucasus. Irregular groups like the White Legion continue to diminish the possibility of successful negotiations between Georgia and Abkhazia.

Sri Lankan bombing shows need for force protection

A mid-October 1997 truck-bomb blast engineered by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE, may have been intended in part to intimidate U.S. support to Sri Lanka's counterinsurgency efforts. The bomb was detonated near Colombo hotels and left at least 11 people dead and more than 100 injured. Sri Lankan commandos killed some of the fleeing LTTE perpetrators, and two other Tigers reportedly took their own lives, in keeping with the common LTTE practice. Commentaries from Sri Lanka and elsewhere in the region suggested that the blast may have been aimed at a U.S. Special Forces training team that was alleged to have been staying at a hotel in the area of the blast. It has been postulated that the LTTE intended to replicate the "Lebanese and Somalian experience" and to precipitate the withdrawal of U.S. security assistance to the Sri Lankan government. Whether remotely accurate or not, this view illustrates the popular foreign perception that strikes against U.S. forces can yield great dividends. Such a perception clearly underscores the importance of force protection.

Vigilante group organized to fight crime

The appearance of "private justice" groups in a number of areas of the world has accompanied general breakdowns of law and order or local perceptions that criminal activity is not being adequately punished. In recent years, reports of vigilantism have surfaced in a number of troubled regions, including rural, urban and suburban areas of South Africa. In South Africa, as one regional assessment put it, "ordinary citizens countrywide are increasingly

acting on their own” to deal with rising rates of crime and violence. A 50-percent increase in attacks on farms over the last year has energized the formation of rural self-defense groups, while in more heavily populated areas, rising rates of urban criminality have generated neighborhood watch groups and far stronger responses. In some cases, these groups have a measure of continuity — and a political or ideological agenda — that gives them substantial weight and influence. This is the case for the armed organization People Against Gangsterism and Drugs, or PAGAD, that operates in the Western Cape region. PAGAD focuses on confronting and punishing members of violent drug-trafficking gangs. PAGAD surfaced publicly in 1996 and has achieved some notoriety — first for its violent clashes with the numerous, highly profitable drug-trafficking gangs in the West Cape and, subsequently, for its confrontations with the police. PAGAD members are drawn from a large Muslim population, and reports of their ties to Iran and to terrorist Islamic groups — including Hamas, Hizbollah and others — form a backdrop to PAGAD’s activities. PAGAD’s leadership has, in fact, asserted that offers of help have come from Islamic extremist groups, an assertion that has fueled rumors of Iranian-sponsored attacks on Western interests in South Africa. In that same vein, Western reporting has alleged that PAGAD members have been trained in western Iran. Nevertheless, despite the alarmist international allegations, it is the rise of violent crime and the controversial response from one segment of a community that have had the broadest implications for South Africa. In this regard, some analysts suggest that PAGAD may be the genesis of analogous groups forming around the country — black and white, urban and rural — to provide self-protection and to exact extra-legal justice whenever they deem it necessary. The impact of this kind of development on the national stability is universally viewed as a negative one.

Venezuelan troops deploy to fight guerrilla incursions

In October 1997, Venezuela announced the deployment of thousands of additional troops to its border with Colombia. The additional troops are expected to help control the cross-border activities carried out by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC; the National Liberation Army, or ELN; the Popular Liberation Army, or EPL; and the often indistinguishable drug traffickers and other criminal groupings. In a new development, Venezuelan authorities have discovered pamphlets in the western border state of Tachira that suggest that a new Colombian group, the Colombian Authentic Rebels, or RAC, has been formed and has established a presence in several states on both sides of the border. According to the pamphlets, RAC claims to deplore the involvement of other Colombian insurgent groups in profit-making criminal activities, alleging that the groups have abandoned the true revolutionary path. The new group, whose real existence and nature are still being assessed by Venezuelan security specialists, has asserted its willingness to undertake armed actions to destroy the criminal infrastructure of “pseudo revolutionaries” along the border and to reveal who supports its local activities. A presumed guerrilla organization like RAC could also provide a cover for the activities of local “vigilante” groups bent on restoring security to the troubled border area.



Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

Special Warfare

Schoomaker takes command of USSOCOM

General Peter J. Schoomaker took command of the U.S. Special Operations Command during a ceremony at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., Nov. 5.

Schoomaker succeeds General Hugh Shelton, who replaced retiring General John Shalikashvili on Oct. 1 as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Schoomaker had commanded the U.S. Army Special Operations Command since August 1996. His other special-operations assignments include command at the Special Forces detachment, company, battalion and group levels and command of the Joint Special Operations Command.

In other general-officer assignments, Schoomaker served as assistant division commander, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; and as deputy director for operations, readiness and mobilization, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

Schoomaker is a graduate of the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, the Command and General Staff College and the National War College.

SWCS developing new PSYOP documents

The Psychological Operations Training and Doctrine Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School is developing two documents that will be important for PSYOP in the 21st century.

The PSYOP Division has recently helped to form a 12-person process-

action team to develop the operational concept for PSYOP in the 21st century. Using as its guide discussions generated during a 1997 meeting of past and present commanders of the 4th PSYOP Group, the team will identify the roles, missions and tasks that PSYOP will face in the next century. The team will also determine how PSYOP can best be integrated into the field of information operations and how PSYOP forces will need to prepare for necessary changes in equipment, organization and training.

The team includes representatives from the Special Warfare Center and School; the 2nd, 4th and 7th PSYOP groups; the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command; and the Army Special Operations Command.

The PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division is also working on ARTEP 33-725-60-MTP, *Mission Training Plan for the Psychological Operations Task Force*. This publication will replace ARTEP 33-705-MTP, *Mission Training Plan for the Psychological Operations Battalion Headquarters*, 23 October 1989; ARTEP 33-707-30-MTP *Mission Training Plan for the Psychological Operations Support Company*, 11 August 1995; and ARTEP 33-708-MTP, *Mission Training Plan for the Psychological Operations Tactical Support Company*, 20 September 1994. The new MTP will provide a descriptive, mission-oriented training program for all elements of a POTF. Commanders will use the MTP to train their staffs to perform critical missions and to describe the main supporting missions to be executed. The initial draft of the MTP has been staffed to active- and

reserve-component PSYOP units for comments. Publication of the final MTP is scheduled for the third quarter of fiscal year 1998.

For more information, telephone the PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division at DSN 239-7259/7257 or commercial (910) 432-7259/7257.

MFF badges authorized for permanent wear

The Chief of Staff of the Army has approved military free-fall parachutist and jumpmaster badges for permanent wear.

Approval was contained in MILPER Message NR 97-154, Military Free Fall Parachutist Badges - Permanent Wear, dated 171515Z Oct 97.

The MFF parachutist badges were authorized for wear in 1994, but soldiers were authorized to wear them only while assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command or the Army Special Operations Command or its elements.

Parachutists are eligible to wear the badges once they have completed a MFF course approved by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School or have made an MFF combat jump. The jumpmaster badge is worn by those who have completed a SWCS-approved MFF jumpmaster course.

Soldiers must obtain authorization before wearing the badges. The commanding general of the Special Warfare Center and School is the approving authority for students who have graduated from the MFF parachutist and jumpmaster courses after Oct. 1, 1994. The USSOCOM commander is the approving authority for all other applicants.

Army SOF personnel who quali-

fied in MFF before Oct. 1, 1994, must obtain authorization to wear the badges by submitting a written request to: Commander, USAJFK-SWCS; Attn: AOJK-GPD-SA; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. They must include name, rank, SSN, MOS, a copy of their DA Form 1307 (Individual jump record), and supporting documents such as graduation or qualification certificates.

FM 41-10 revision under way at SWCS

The Civil Affairs/Civil-Military Operations Division of the Special Warfare Center and School is revising the cornerstone doctrinal publication for Civil Affairs, FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs*.

The initial draft of the new publication was released to the field for comments in March 1997. Using comments received from the field, the CA/CMO Division prepared a revised edition that was used by a special FM 41-10 working group that met in September 1997 to refine the draft manual.

The working group included senior leaders of the CA/CMO Division; the SWCS Reserve Components Division; the Army CA and PSYOP Command; the 351st, 352nd, and 353rd CA Commands; the 358th and 361st CA Brigades; the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute; the I Corps G5; the 96th CA Battalion; the Joint Special Operations Forces Institute, and the Army Special Operations Command.

The working group made the following recommendations:

- That FM 41-10 be titled *Civil Affairs Operations*.
- That SWCS pursue the creation of an FM 100-XX manual on Army civil-military operations.
- That FM 41-10 revise its definitions: "civil affairs" should designate the force; "civil affairs activities" should designate the specific missions, duties and responsibilities

that are conducted only by CA forces; "civil-military operations" should designate the mission.

- That FM 41-10 incorporate structural changes in accordance with USACAPOC guidance (i.e., all tactical teams will be called "tactical support teams" and will consist of four personnel, led by a captain; brigade support teams will consist of six personnel, led by a major).

- That FM 41-10 use the generic term "CA battalion" instead of CA battalion (GP), (GS), (FID/UW).

- That FM 41-10 include a chapter on logistics and the sustainment of CA forces.

- That Chapter 8 of FM 41-10 be titled "CA Aspects of Information Operations" instead of "Intelligence Aspects of CA Activities in CMO."

- That FM 41-10 go into more depth on civil-administration and post-hostilities operations.

For more information, phone the CA/CMO Division at DSN 239-1654/8253 or commercial (910) 432-1654/8253.

USASOC announces NCO, Soldier of the Year

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command has announced the winners of its competition for NCO and Soldier of the Year.

The NCO of the Year is Staff Sergeant Thomas E. Fuller of the 75th Ranger Regiment. The Soldier of the Year is Specialist Eric W. Totten, also of the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Runners-up were Staff Sergeant Tina M. Carazo of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, and Specialist Darren M. Ashworth of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command.

Other competitors were Staff Sergeant Jerman Henry of the Special Operations Support Battalion; Staff Sergeant Shane Ladd of the Army Special Forces Command; Staff Sergeant Dwayne A. Wegner of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command; Sergeant Marc

A. Gianotti of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment; Specialist Graydon B. Griffin of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Specialist Clifford Hollensteiner of the Special Operations Support Battalion; Specialist Michael G. Smith of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment; and Private First Class J.D. Rodriguez of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.

Rangers looking for officers

The 75th Ranger Regiment is seeking top-quality, highly motivated Ranger-qualified officers for service in the Regiment.

The Regiment has openings for officers in the following branches: Infantry, Military Intelligence, Signal Corps, Field Artillery, Medical Corps and Chemical Corps.

The Regiment hires officers throughout the year for positions in the regimental headquarters at Fort Benning, Ga.; and in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Ranger battalions, located at Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.; Fort Lewis, Wash.; and Fort Benning.

Interested officers should send a packet containing their ORB, DA photo, current APFT scorecard, a copy of DA Form 4187 requesting assignment to the Ranger Regiment, letters of recommendation, copies of all AERs and OERs, and a letter of intent to the Regimental commander (stating date of availability, home and work phone numbers, and why they wish to become part of the Ranger Regiment). Mail packets to: Commander; 75th Ranger Regiment; Attn: AORG-SA; Fort Benning, GA 31905-5843. Applicants should submit the packets at least eight months before their current tours will be completed. For more information, telephone DSN 835-5124 or commercial (706) 545-5124.



Book Reviews

Special Warfare


Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium.

By Rudolph C. Barnes Jr. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1996. ISBN: 0-7146-4624-5. 199 pages. \$37.50.

General John J. Sheehan, former commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command, has said, "Whether it is in Bosnia, Kuwait, Haiti, or Guantanamo Bay, the lessons are all the same. ... We must change the way we do business. We must steer by the stars. ... We can no longer steer by our wake." In that regard, Colonel Rudolph C. Barnes Jr. has written a definitive statement about the military's role in the growing field of operations other than war and about the military's relation to the accomplishment of U.S. foreign-policy objectives.

What is mission success in OOTW? How can we achieve success when our objective is not to defeat an enemy with overwhelming force but to achieve political objectives through public support at home and in the area of operations? What is leadership in OOTW? What is the civil-military capability in OOTW? How do we define the role of the soldier and of the state in the post-Cold War era?

Barnes answers these questions and defines post-Cold War threats and strategies in terms of legitimacy. He focuses on the legitimacy of peacetime operations and the public support that is both a requirement and a measure of military legitimacy. Bringing together many sources of history, law, doctrine and policy directives, Barnes gives readers an interesting, historical evaluation of military standards of conduct in war and of



the way they have led to current U.S. military involvement in OOTW and domestic-relief operations.

A colonel in the Army Reserve, Barnes practices law in Prosperity, S.C. On active duty in the late 1960s, he served as judge advocate and as a Civil Affairs officer with the Special Action Force-Asia in Okinawa. As a reservist he has served in operations in Grenada, Honduras and Moldova; he has served as the command judge advocate (IMA) of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School; and he has served as the staff judge advocate for the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.

Barnes summarizes the capabilities that the U.S. has acquired in order to meet the post-Cold War threat. He also describes the core principles of U.S. foreign-policy objectives, not only in terms of national interests but in terms of

national values; i.e., democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Of particular interest to CA soldiers is Barnes' summary of the strategic CA mission from the period before World War II through recent operations in Haiti. He tells the history of military involvement with foreign governments in civil administration — from military government to nation assistance — and explains why the CA strategic mission is an important factor in OOTW mission success.

Barnes describes how the diplomat-warrior personifies legitimacy in peacetime and why he or she is an effective means of leadership in filling the gap between diplomacy and conventional combat operations. He defines the capabilities of the reserve components in the Total Force (particularly CA) and explains why failure to effectively employ diplomat-warriors and the CA dimension can lead to failure in the OOTW mission and in achieving U.S. foreign-policy objectives.

General Wayne A. Downing, former CINCSOC, has said, "Civil Affairs can be critical components of a regional or country plan ... designed to alleviate the problems that cause instability. Often a root cause of conflict ... is a failure of civil infrastructure to meet the needs of the population. The skills needed to manage a country's infrastructure — sanitation, public transport, legal systems, and other public services — can be maintained only by people with similar civilian backgrounds. Highly skilled personnel from the Reserves have performed such jobs in Panama, the Persian Gulf, and Haiti ... (and they

offer) expertise that exists only in the Reserve CA units.”

Barnes observes that the conventional military's level of understanding of the CA mission still remains, at best, at the level of the “Red Storm Rising” scenario — getting civilians out of combat zones.

Although *Military Legitimacy* was written just as ministerial-advisory-team missions were unfolding in Haiti and before CA operations began in Bosnia, subsequent events in both countries proved Barnes correct in his assessment of strategic CA as the dimension of military capability and of the diplomat-warrior as the dimension of leadership essential for mission success in OOTW. For critics who say that OOTW is a job for some other agency (DOS, USAID, etc.) and not a job for the military, the author's message is that no other agency in the U.S. government can accomplish the task.

The SOF community should read and note well Barnes' observations and analysis. The CA community especially must thoroughly understand its role in peace operations, domestic-relief operations, and interagency-task-force operations. For those who have served in Haiti, in Bosnia, or in any other of CA's worldwide missions, Barnes' arguments will ring true.

CA has to be effective in stating its case both to the military and to the congressional hierarchy, and Barnes gives readers solid reasoning and a good understanding of the facts. The CA soldier who lives with constant deployments and year-round foreign operations now has a valuable and interesting resource that articulates the case for CA.

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The Last Hundred Yards: The NCO's Contribution to Warfare.

By H.J. Poole. Emerald Isle, N.C.: Posterity Press. ISBN: 0-9638695-2-3. 399 pages. \$19.95.

In *The Last Hundred Yards*, H.J. Poole has written a tactics review intended to be used as a reference manual for NCOs in all the services. Throughout the 26 chapters of the book, Poole concentrates on a neglected area of military writing: tactics in the close battle, the domain of the NCO.

Poole's thesis is excellent — most current manuals focus on larger elements and concepts, but Poole describes ways to integrate tactics at the small-unit level and emphasizes the importance of NCOs making tactical decisions. Many of the techniques and procedures in the book are those Poole acquired in 28 years of service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In the first eight chapters of the book, Poole covers the roles, habits and anatomy of small units in order to address what he considers to be a shortfall of recorded knowledge in these areas. Poole discusses such problems as the different styles of

warfare, the role of small units, the role of weapons, and the ways by which to win consistently.

Part Two, chapters 9-26, is the meat of the book. It covers subjects such as indirect fires, close air support, ambushes and counterambushes. An entire chapter is devoted to the techniques of walking point.

Much of the information in the book is not new and can be found in other manuals. The advantage is that Poole's work provides a one-volume compilation of a number of different sources. Poole's writing style is also interesting and easier to read than most field manuals. While some of the procedures Poole describes may be dated, the book is still worth reading for its underlying principles.

Part of the message that Poole conveys is that tactical proficiency, rather than high technology, wins battles. For the special-operations soldier, that idea will not be hard to accept: SOF is based on people, not technology. The importance of the soldier is ingrained in SOF's basic tenets, and SOF have already embraced the concept of involving NCOs in the decision-making process. Still, Poole's book is recommended as a valuable reference for teaching soldiers about small-unit operations and infantry techniques. His premise that NCOs make the difference in the last 100 yards is one that is well worth consideration.

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Special Warfare is available on the Worldwide Web at www.usasoc.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm.

Special Warfare

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